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ABSTRACT 
The official government justification for the construction of the West Bank 
barrier is that it was a security measure necessitated by an increase in Palestinian 
terrorism during the Second Intifada.  There are many challenges to this narrative, 
however. The slow pace of construction on the barrier over five years before its 
eventual abandonment in 2007 calls into question the sense of urgency one would 
expect from a project intended to address an immediate and intense physical security 
threat. Most notably, the long, winding route of the barrier and its path over 
strategically problematic terrain further complicate the state’s security routines and raise 
questions about how exactly such a route serves Israel’s security needs. This study uses 
discourse analysis to answer the following question:  Given the high monetary and 
reputational costs and the added complication to physical security routines, why did 
Israel choose to erect the West Bank barrier? This study analyzes 63 texts, comprised 
of 7 interviews, 8 government reports, 41 news articles and op-eds, and 7 political 
speeches from the Second Intifada years (2000-2005), focusing analysis on the 
discursive construction of Palestinian violence and the decision to construct the West 
Bank barrier. The results of this study suggest that, while the physical security threat 
posed by the violence of the Second Intifada necessitated a physical security response, 
the violence of the Second Intifada, and Israel’s initial response to it, threatened three of 
the state’s identities: the security-seeking state identity, the Jewish national identity, and 
the democratic identity. This ontological security crisis made the West Bank barrier, a 
policy option that had been rejected from the time of Yitzhak Rabin, palatable. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 The official government justification for the construction of the West 
Bank barrier is that it was a security measure necessitated by an increase in Palestinian 
terrorism during the Second Intifada. In response to questions and criticisms suggesting 
the barrier might have other purposes, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs insists, “The 
route of the fence has been determined on the basis of security needs and topographical 
considerations.”1 There are many challenges to this narrative, however. As Lupovici 
notes, the barrier’s slow construction process of five years before its eventual 
abandonment in 2007 calls into question the sense of urgency one would expect from a 
project intended to address an immediate and intense physical security threat.2 Most 
notably, the long, winding route of the barrier and its path over strategically problematic 
terrain further complicate the state’s security routines and raise questions about how 
exactly such a route serves Israel’s security needs.3 Why, then, would the state choose 
such a policy option? This study analyzes 63 texts, comprised of 7 interviews, 8 
government reports, 41 news articles and op-eds, and 7 political speeches from the 
Second Intifada years (2000-2005), focusing analysis on the discursive construction of 
Palestinian violence and the decision to construct the West Bank barrier. The results of 
this study suggest that, while the physical security threat posed by the violence of the 
Second Intifada necessitated a security response, the discourse around the threat and the 
policy options reveal that ontological insecurity played a central role in the decision to 
construct the barrier. That is, the violence of the Second Intifada, and Israel’s initial 
                                                 
1 “Saving Lives,” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2003: 9. 
2 Amir Lupovici, “Ontological Dissonance, Clashing Identities, and Israel’s Unilateral Steps Towards the 
Palestinians,” Review of International Studies 38, no. 4 (2011): 820. 
3 Ibid. 
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response to it, threatened three of the state’s identities: the security-seeking state 
identity, the Jewish national identity, and the democratic identity. This ontological 
security crisis made palatable a policy option that had been rejected from the time of 
Yitzhak Rabin. This study finds that the discursive construction of the barrier as a 
solution to the threats against the state’s identities, especially the Jewish national 
identity, largely explains not only the state’s choice of this policy option, but also the 
barrier’s route.  
An important premise of realist explanations for state behavior is that the 
security states seek is physical. In line with this, the realist explanation for Israel’s 
decision to construct the West Bank barrier is that such a decision amounted to security-
seeking behavior in a situation in which its adversary’s intentions were unknowable. 
This explanation, however, is not supported by the evidence. The IDF itself concluded 
that there were four possible security solutions to the escalating violence of the Second 
Intifada: continuing “current policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians…, declaring war on the 
PA, agreeing to resume the peace talks at the point they stopped in Taba, and unilateral 
separation”—with continuation of current policy being the preferred security option and 
unilateral separation being the least desirable.4 In the end, the Israeli government chose 
the option that was least preferable among favored physical security solutions but best 
addressed threats to its identities.  
Almost sixty thousand Palestinians cross the barrier daily without 
documentation, and 44 percent of terror attacks carried out in recent years were 
                                                 
4 “Walls and Borders,” Israel National News (Jerusalem), August 20, 2001.. 
3 
 
committed by Palestinians who had crossed the barrier without permits.5 Additionally, 
large sections of the barrier called “fingers” reach deep into the West Bank to include 
Jewish settlements on the west side of the barrier, crossing terrain that is not defensible 
due to its topography and proximity to densely populated Palestinian cities.  
While the barrier’s route has undoubtedly improved security outcomes for 
Jewish settlements in the West Bank, often encircling entire Palestinian towns to protect 
nearby settlements, this has come at the cost of significant security risk, monetary cost, 
and reputational risk to the state of Israel.6 Additionally, the barrier’s deviation from the 
Green line has placed it between Palestinian villages and their adjacent farmlands, 
necessitating the installation and management of several agricultural gates along the 
barrier, increasing the security risk to IDF soldiers manning the gates, Palestinians 
attempting to pass through them, and nearby Israeli towns while also increasing the 
monetary cost of the barrier. The strategic disadvantages of the barrier’s route, its slow 
construction, and its many gaps are problematic to the physical security explanation. 
Ontological insecurity caused by the violence of the Second Intifada provides a useful 
alternative explanation, and there is much evidence in the discourse of ontological 
insecurity around the Second Intifada as well as the potential solutions to it.  
Background 
The Second Intifada, also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada, began in September 
2000 when then opposition leader Ariel Sharon (Likud), accompanied by armed Israeli 
                                                 
5 Kamel Hawwash, “Israel’s ‘Apartheid Wall’ Inspires More Violence Than It Deters,” Middle East Eye, 
September 12, 2016, http://www.middleeasteye.net/columns/israels-apartheid-wall-inspires-more-
violence-it-deters-2003696254. 
6 Jonathan Rynhold, “Israel’s Fence: Can Separation Make Better Neighbours?,” Survival 46, no. 1 
(2004): 64. 
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soldiers and police, entered Haram al-Sharif and the Al-Aqsa Mosque therein to assert 
Jewish claims to the Temple Mount. Given Sharon’s role in the massacre of Sabra and 
Shatila in Lebanon in 1982 and the sacredness of the sites to Islam, his presence with 
armed guards amounted to desecration in the eyes of Muslims across the world.7 
Furthermore, the incendiary political statement came on the heels of the failed peace 
talks at the Camp David Summit of 2000. The failure of Camp David left Palestinians 
and Israelis with mutual feelings of distrust, betrayal, and disillusionment.  
Coupled with this failure, Sharon’s trip to the Temple Mount convinced 
Palestinians that Israel had abandoned the peace process. Palestinians, Israeli Arabs, and 
left-leaning Israeli Jews took to the streets together to voice their disdain for this move. 
The protests soon gave way to violent attacks, including suicide bombings, shootings, 
rocket fire from Hamas-controlled Gaza, and other violence directed at the state of 
Israel. The Israeli response was viewed as harsh by the international community and 
escalated with each new attack. Civilians and combatants alike endured the violence of 
the Second Intifada until it finally ended in a truce in February 2005. 
The Current Study 
This study uses discourse analysis to answer the following question:  Given the 
high monetary and reputational costs and the added complication to physical security 
routines, why did Israel choose to erect the West Bank barrier? Utilizing this method, 
the study examines two sets of data: (1) interviews with Knesset Members, political 
journalists, and academics in Israel and (2) political speeches, op-eds, and news articles 
                                                 
7 Joel Greenberg, “Sharon Touches a Nerve, and Jerusalem Explodes,” New York Times (New York: NY), 
September 29, 2000, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/29/world/sharon-touches-a-nerve-and-
jerusalem-explodes.html. 
5 
 
discussing the proposed barrier and the violence emanating from the West Bank during 
the Second Intifada. Data analysis focuses on the discursive construction of violence 
during the Second Intifada and the legitimization of the barrier as a policy option. 
Because this study is focused on the discursive construction of the barrier as the 
preferred policy response to the Second Intifada, only texts produced from 2001 
through 2005 are analyzed, with the exception of interviews collected in Israel in 2017. 
These interviews provided the preliminary categories for an emergent analysis, which 
then refined the categories according to evidence in the discourse.  
Consistent with Lupovici’s analysis, this study finds the salient national 
identities of Israel to this policy decision are the security-seeker identity, the Jewish 
identity, and the democratic identity. Contrary to his analysis, however, which posits the 
presence of an ontological security dissonance and constructs the barrier policy as an 
avoidance measure, I find that the security-seeking identity and the Jewish identity were 
perceived to be under threat but the democratic identity was not. Additionally, while I 
find evidence of ontological security threat within the discourse, evidence of ontological 
dissonance is minimal and fleeting, disappearing as the discourse reconstructs the 
barrier policy in terms of national identity. The decision to construct the West Bank 
barrier, then, was not an avoidance response to ontological security dissonance but a 
direct response to ontological insecurity around Israel’s intertwined identities as a 
Jewish state and a security-seeker.  
 In Chapter One, I provide a review of the international relations literature on 
borders and border fortification and situate this study within the literature. I then further 
detail my research method, including the theoretical underpinnings and assumptions of 
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discourse analysis, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of this method, especially as 
it applies to national identity research. Chapter One finishes with a detailed breakdown 
of the stages of this analysis.  
 Chapter Two details the theories salient to this study. The first section elaborates 
ontological security at the individual level, unpacking the relationship between 
identities and interests. This section details the individual need for cognitive certainty 
and the importance of this certainty to agency, as well as the roles of relationships and 
routines to identity, and ends with an explanation of critical situations, the sources of 
ontological insecurity. Thereafter, I extrapolate the human need for ontological security 
to the state level and offer justification for the state as an ontological security seeker. 
Here, I conceptualize the state as a social actor and explain the relationship between 
individual identities and state identities. This section offers an explanation of 
ontological security and national identity and explains the connection between 
relationships and routines at the state level. In the final section, I detail one application 
of this theory to the case of the state of Israel and its decision to construct the West 
Bank barrier and problematize some of the argument’s assumptions. 
 Chapter Three details the empirical evidence analyzed in this study. In 
accordance with the evidence in the discourse, I diverge slightly from Lupovici in my 
conceptualization of Israel’s security-seeker identity, explicating the national narrative 
of security exceptionalism. I show the role of this narrative in Israel’s perception of 
threat to the security-seeker identity and explain how the West Bank barrier was 
discursively constructed as a solution to threats posed to this identity. This discussion is 
followed by a detailed explanation of the Jewish national identity, as well as the 
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evidence of perceived threats to this identity in the discourse. Like the previous section, 
the end of this section provides evidence of the discursive construction of the West 
Bank barrier as a solution to perceived threats to the Jewish national identity. In the 
final section of this chapter, I diverge completely from Lupovici in my findings on the 
democratic identity of Israel. While this identity is present in the discourse, it is not 
perceived to be threatened. Rather, it is called upon in the discourse as justification for 
reasserting the Jewish national identity through exclusion from the democratic process. 
Here, I provide a different understanding of Israel’s democratic identity, showing the 
prevailing understanding of democracy within the discourse as supporting Israel’s 
identity as an ethnic democracy in the mode of a defending democracy. Rather than an 
individualistic understanding of Israel as a liberal democracy, I argue that the Israeli 
democracy more closely resembles an ethnic democracy, a communalistic democracy 
that holds paramount the interests of the ethnoreligious majority. This thesis concludes 
with some implications for ontological security theory, democratic theory, and the 
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, as well as avenues for potential future research.   
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CHAPTER ONE 
The official government explanation of the West Bank barrier as a measure to 
ensure the state’s physical security is very much in line with defensive realist views of 
states as rational security-seekers. However, several realities of the barrier itself and of 
Israel’s security successes challenge this view. As Lupovici notes, the barrier’s long, 
drawn out construction process, beginning in 2002 and halting abruptly in 2007 (long 
after the Intifada ended in early 2005), belies any sense of urgency in improving 
security along the Green Line.8 Additionally, the barrier’s route over ‘topographically 
inferior terrain’ and its many gaps call into question its utility as a security measure.9 
Indeed, nearly sixty thousand Palestinians cross the barrier daily without 
documentation, and 44 percent of terror attacks carried out in recent years were 
committed by Palestinians who had crossed the barrier without permits.10  
Furthermore, several sections of the barrier reach deep into the West Bank to 
include Jewish settlements, crossing terrain that is strategically problematic due to its 
topography and proximity to densely populated Palestinian areas. While this route has 
certainly improved security outcomes for Jewish settlements in the West Bank, this has 
come at the cost of significant security risk to Israel proper.11 Additionally, as Rynhold 
notes, “Deviation from the Green Line has also complicated the defence of those 
borders by necessitating the construction of 41 extra gates to allow Palestinians to reach 
farmland on the Israeli side of the barrier.”12 The strategic disadvantages of the barrier’s 
                                                 
8 Amir Lupovici, 820. 
9 Ibid. 
10 Hawwash. 
11 Rynhold, 64. 
12 Ibid. 
9 
 
route, its slow construction, and its many gaps are problematic to the physical security 
explanation. Why, then, would the state of Israel incur great financial and reputational 
costs to construct such a barrier? The following section provides a review of the 
security literature on borders and fortified barriers, followed by a detailed description of 
the method and strategies employed in this study.  
Borders and Barriers in the Literature 
A large body of research within the security studies literature is concerned with 
exploring the role and function of state borders. A particularly contentious debate 
within this literature involves the relationship between borders and state sovereignty, 
and this debate has evolved over the last forty years. Comfortably situated within realist 
thinking is a material approach to the role of borders and an emphasis on territoriality, 
which dominate the early literature. Robert Jervis, for example, emphasizes the 
importance of strong borders to a state’s security, going so far as to argue that weak 
borders are unstable and leave a state vulnerable to attack and absorption by a 
neighboring state.13 Additionally, realists argue that borders are essential to defending a 
state’s territory, which is considered by some to be the most important source of 
military power and the most common cause of interstate wars.14 Drawing on examples 
from both world wars and steeped in the adversarial international climate of the Cold 
War, Walt focuses not on the strength of borders, but on the relative strength of states 
separated by them, taking for granted the significance of such borders in his analysis.15 
                                                 
13 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics 30, no. 2 (1978): 195. 
14 James D. Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War,” International Organization 49, no. 3 (1995): 408. 
15 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, no. 
4 (1985): 3-43. 
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While these related approaches to state borders are useful in understanding the decision 
making of state leaders whose calculations rely mostly on a material approach to power, 
they do not account for the growing complexities of international relations in an 
increasingly globalized world, especially where borders and border security are 
concerned. For example, theorists within the realist tradition neglect the growing 
importance of non-state actors, choosing to focus almost exclusively on states.16  In fact, 
Walt argues that the focus of security studies is interstate war.17 The realist approach to 
the importance of borders as a defense against other states occupies a large part of the 
security discourse and remains a significant voice in the globalization debate 
(elaborated below), which commands a large portion of the research produced near the 
end of the 20th century and continues to be an influential body of work in the security 
literature.  
 Globalists argue against the realist assumption that state borders are an essential 
facet of international relations in a dangerous, anarchic international system and, 
therefore, should be conceptualized as material defenses against other states. These 
scholars “emphasize the blurring of domestic and international boundaries in an 
interdependent world, which relies on the free flow of goods, money, people, and ideas 
or norms.”18 In an influential case study of the European Community in 1993, John G. 
Ruggie takes realists to task for failing to account for the changing nature of the system 
in which states operate, criticizing realist theorists for neglecting the growing salience 
                                                 
16 John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2001).  
17 Stephen M. Walt, “The Renaissance of Security Studies,” International Studies Quarterly 35, no. 2 
(1991): 212-213. 
18 Virginie Guiraudon and Gallya Lahav, “A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate: The Case of 
Migration Control,” Comparative Political Studies 33, no. 2 (2000): 164. 
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of macrostructures in the world system.19 He maintains the relevance of states while 
suggesting the shifting and multifaceted role of borders in an increasingly globalized 
system of international economic institutions, which contribute to “unbundling 
territoriality.”20 Ruggie suggests an unbundling of the various types of state authority 
from territoriality not as a threat to state sovereignty but as a reimagining of the 
complexities of state authority.  
Sassen contributes to this globalist view in her 1996 book, in which she argues 
that globalization has contributed to a denationalization of territory and that human 
rights norms imposed by supragovernmental institutions have eroded state control of 
borders, especially where immigration is concerned.21 Sassen’s understanding 
emphasizes human rights norms and posits a new form of economic citizenship as 
eroding state sovereignty and border control altogether. Drawing heavily from Ruggie’s 
work, Edward Cohen argues that “it is this very fungibility of sovereignty that helps us 
understand why the authority of a state need not absolutely track the territorial borders 
of a political community.”22 Cohen, like Ruggie, understands globalization as a 
rearrangement of state authority that deemphasizes border security without eroding the 
sovereignty of the states or the relevance of borders themselves. These globalist 
viewpoints are increasingly challenged by a growing cohort of security scholars who 
                                                 
19 John Gerard Ruggie, “Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations,” 
International Organization 47, no. 1 (1993): 140. 
20 Ibid., 160-165. 
21 Saskia Sassen, Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1996).  
22 Edward S. Cohen, “Globalization and the Boundaries of the State: A Framework for Analyzing the 
Changing Practice of Sovereignty,” Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 
14, no. 1 (2001): 80. 
12 
 
point to globalization as a driver of increased border security and the reinvigoration of 
territoriality. 
 While this globalist perspective remains robust in the security literature, a 
related body of research emphasizes the significance of state borders and, with it, the 
centrality of territoriality as responses by states to globalization. Territoriality is a 
central concept in much of the literature on state borders and is defined by Sack as “the 
attempt by an individual or group to affect, influence, or control people, phenomena, 
and relationships by delimiting and asserting control over a geographic area.”23 With an 
eye on international institutions and their relationship to the territoriality of states, 
Guiraudon and Lahav directly challenge globalists like Sassen. They examine 
international jurisprudence and norms vis-à-vis migration control and conclude that 
international institutions do not infringe on states’ rights to control migration and, 
instead, uphold their prerogative to restrict movement across their borders.24 In an 
article published one year later, Zacher confronts Ruggie’s assessment of the 
significance of state borders; he unpacks the “territorial integrity norm” and 
demonstrates its significance in shaping a world order, not only in Western international 
institutions but across Africa and the Middle East as well.25 Peter Andreas builds upon 
the work of these scholars and seeks to identify the new nature of state borders.26 He 
identifies three types of borders (military, economic, and police borders) and examines 
their historical trajectories, concluding that the police border is on the rise as a result of 
                                                 
23 Robert David Sack, Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1986): 19.  
24 Guiraudon and Lahav, 167.  
25 Mark W. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the Use of Force,” 
International Organization 55, no. 2 (2001): 215-250. 
26 Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the Line: Borders and Security in the Twenty-First Century,” International 
Security 28, no. 2 (2003): 78-111. 
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states’ interests in securing their borders against “clandestine transnational actors.”27 
This view of the police border is particularly relevant to the West Bank barrier, as it is 
ostensibly intended not to fortify one state against another but to protect a state’s 
interests from clandestine transnational actors. For Andreas, and for those security 
scholars who continue to draw upon his work, globalization has not eroded the 
significance of borders but has shifted the focus of states’ security concerns toward non-
state actors, leading to an increase in border policing. This body of research contributes 
to a more nuanced understanding of borders in the current international system, and the 
current study adds to this work by making a case for an additional type of border policy, 
adding to Andreas’s typology the identity border, which serves to determine ingroup 
and outgroup status and delineates the boundaries of such.  
 In addition to the debate over the significance of borders in an increasingly 
globalized world, another important focus of discussion within the literature deals with 
the changing function of borders. Drawing on Andreas’s important work on borders as 
filters against clandestine transnational actors, scholars are divided over the specific 
security interests served by heavily policed borders. The general framework within 
which this debate takes place is well-articulated by Adamson, who understands borders 
as filters through which labor and capital flow at an unequal rate selected by the state 
into which they move.28 Human migration, she notes, is unique in globalization in that 
the movement of people across borders is much more restricted than that of goods and 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 85. 
28 Fiona B. Adamson, “Crossing Borders: International Migration and National Security,” International 
Security 31, no. 1 (2006): 173-174. 
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services.29 A growing body of literature focuses on the restriction of human migration 
across increasingly policed borders, but scholars disagree as to which security interests 
are paramount in states’ restrictions on immigration. That is, what sort of clandestine 
transnational actors are borders meant to exclude?  
Avdan and Gelpi, for example, build on the works by Adamson and Andreas 
mentioned above and argue that security against terrorism is the paramount concern of 
states in terms of border security, citing a growing trend in the erection of fortified 
borders in frontier states in the European Union.30 Their empirical analysis of border 
fences shows a reduced average annual relative risk of a terrorist attack by 67 percent 
for states who erected fortified physical barriers against terror groups in neighboring 
states.31 A significant limitation of this work is that the effectiveness of barriers in 
limiting the incidence of terror attacks from groups within neighboring states is not a 
sufficient condition to argue that national security is the paramount concern of states 
who erect such barriers. One must also show that the barrier itself is responsible for 
security success, rather than more complex security practices, that political discourse 
regarding construction of a barrier reflects a focus on physical security, that leaders 
were motivated by physical security concerns, and that the primary benefit of the barrier 
is indeed physical security.  
Freilich offers a qualitative analysis of national security decision-making in 
Israel in which he argues that the very structure of the Israeli government places 
                                                 
29 Ibid., 173. 
30 Nazli Avdan and Christopher Gelpi, “Do Good Fences Make Good Neighbors? Border Barriers and the 
Transnational Flow of Terrorist Violence,” International Studies Quarterly 0 (2016): 11. 
31 Ibid., 12.  
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national security and, with it, anti-terror concerns at the forefront of policy-making.32 
He explains that the Israeli Defense Forces are particularly influential in policy-making 
due to their high level of organization compared to the rest of the Israeli government 
and that this helps to explain the IDF’s success in securing ever-increasing national 
security budgets.33 This analysis is particularly useful in understanding the role of 
internal politics in a states’ approach to national security, but the utility of this analysis 
is limited. While the influence of the Defense Ministry in the Knesset does highlight the 
state’s focus on physical security, it does not explore the complexities of policy 
decision-making.  
 Another body of work in the literature comes from a contingent of scholars who 
understand fortified borders from an economic perspective. In an empirical analysis of 
fortified boundaries, Hassner and Wittenberg explore security interests by comparing 
states that share a border and differentiating between barrier building states and their 
target states.34 While they did find that Muslim states are most often the targets of 
fortified barriers, suggesting that terrorism is a concern for barrier-building states, their 
data also shows that a difference in GDP per capita has a predictive value in whether a 
state erects a fortified barrier.35 They conclude that “rich countries tend to erect barriers 
against poor countries, and that Muslim countries are the principal targets but also the 
major builders of such barriers.”36 For Middle Eastern states specifically, this 
demonstrates the economic aspect of security decision-making of oil economies against 
                                                 
32 Charles D. Freilich, “National Security Decision-Making in Israel: Processes, Pathologies, and 
Strengths,” Middle East Journal 60, no. 4 (2006): 635-663. 
33 Ibid., 658-659. 
34 Ron E. Hassner and Jason Wittenberg, “Barriers to Entry: Who Builds Fortified Boundaries and Why?” 
International Security 40, no. 1 (2015): 157-190. 
35 Ibid., 170-176. 
36 Ibid., 187. 
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clandestine transnational actors from non-oil economies. They argue that states choose 
to erect fortified barriers to increase costs for clandestine transnational actors.37  
Using a similar method, Carter and Poast analyzed data on boundary walls 
separating states from 1800 to 2014 and discovered a distinctly economic nature to the 
securitization of human migration.38 They note that “cross-border economic inequality 
is consistently found to be a core predictor of wall presence and construction,” 
indicating an interest on the part of states to erect fortified boundaries against 
smuggling and unskilled labor.39 Their data also shows an increase in border 
construction in the post-Cold War era, suggesting that “aggressive border management 
strategies are on the rise in the ‘age of globalization.’”40 It is important to note, 
however, that a state’s concerns for national security and economic security may be 
served by the same policy and are not mutually exclusive. 
Unlike the scholars above, Anderson and O’Dowd advocate a more nuanced and 
multicausal understanding of borders as shaping and being shaped by economic 
inequality, national and cultural identities, and territoriality.41 They argue that every 
border and border region is unique and that borders have a variety of uses and meanings 
with diverse characteristics and relations and unique combinations of functions.42 
However, it is useful for our understanding of borders to think more generally about 
how states perceive security threats and seek to address them. A particularly interesting 
                                                 
37 Ibid., 160. 
38 David B. Carter and Paul Poast, “Why Do States Build Walls? Political Economy, Security, and Border 
Stability,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 61, no. 2 (2017) 239-270. 
39 Ibid., 263. 
40 Ibid. 
41 James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd, “Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory 
Meanings, Changing Significance,” Regional Studies 33, no. 7 (1999): 593-604. 
42 Ibid., 594. 
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facet of Anderson and O’Dowd’s work is their attention to the role of borders as both 
physical manifestations of and factors contributing to national and cultural identities. 
Similarly, political geographer David Newman concludes that borders are socially 
constructed by way of “mechanics through which difference is created, exists, and is 
perpetuated.”43 It is this notion of borders that is most useful to understanding why a 
state might construct a fortified barrier in a case for which the national security 
objective is an insufficient explanation. 
 Congruent with this conceptualization of borders as co-constitutive with national 
and cultural identity is the need for states to maintain ontological security. Ontological 
security, as Brent Steele explains, is security as being.44 Put another way, ontological 
security is security in the subjective self, identity.45 A state’s identity shapes and is 
shaped by its actions. As Mitzen explains, “The consequences of action will always 
either reproduce or contradict identities, and since identity motivates action its stability 
over time depends on it being supported in practice.”46 In extraordinary situations, such 
as the Second Intifada, the routinized practices that maintain the Israeli state’s identity 
may be insufficient. As Steele elaborates, critical situations cause ontological insecurity 
because the routines that reaffirm the state’s identity are unable to accommodate 
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extreme circumstances.47  In this way, the chaos of the Intifada disrupted the routines 
that reaffirmed the state’s identity, fomenting an identity crisis.  
One scholar in particular has applied this theory of ontological security to the 
very question of why Israel constructed the West Bank Barrier. The tension created 
between Israel’s identities as both a sovereign security-seeker and a Jewish state by the 
seemingly contradictory solutions to the crisis amounted to what Lupovici calls 
ontological dissonance. Ontological dissonance, he argues, is created by a clash 
between solutions meant to address threats to different identities.48 In such a crisis, a 
state recognizes that measures intended to reaffirm its various identities conflict, and 
this is often reflected in political discourse. Lupovici argues that the political battle over 
the West Bank barrier, specifically its construction and its route separately, displays 
such a crisis. He argues that the Second Intifada created a crisis in which Israel’s 
identities as a Jewish state, a security-seeking sovereign, and a democracy were in 
conflict and that the West Bank barrier was constructed to allay this identity crisis.49 
This explanation, while nuanced, is unsupported by evidence. If a single policy 
response can simultaneously reaffirm three separate identities, there is no ontological 
dissonance. Conversely, if the policy option selected reaffirms a particular identity and 
not the others (or to the detriment of the other identities), then the reaffirmed identity 
may be considered paramount, at least in that specific case, and no dissonance exists. 
How, then, might one discern the intent of this policy vis-à-vis national identity? 
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Lupovici is correct to turn to political discourse. The following section details the 
methodology of the present study.  
Method 
This study is a qualitative study combining elements of the approaches of social 
linguistic analysis and interpretive structuralism to discourse analysis. Utilizing this 
method, the study examined two sets of data: (1) interviews with Knesset Members, 
political journalists, and academics in Israel and (2) political speeches, op-eds, and 
news articles discussing the proposed barrier and the violence emanating from the West 
Bank during the Second Intifada. Data analysis focused on the meaning applied to the 
Second Intifada and how the barrier policy was legitimized through discourse. Several 
studies have used discourse analysis to examine national identity from various 
approaches.50 In this section, I will discuss the theoretical foundations of discourse 
analysis, address common criticisms as well as the strengths and weaknesses of the 
method, and outline the specific analytical strategies employed in this study. 
Foundations of Discourse Analysis 
 A discourse is “the content and construction of meaning and the organization of 
knowledge in a particular realm” and sets the “terms of intelligibility of thought, 
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speech, and action.”51 Discourses are lenses of interpretation through which problems 
can be viewed, and these lenses privilege certain policy solutions over others.52 
Discourse analysis explores the relationship between discourse and reality, how 
discourses are made meaningful and how they “contribute to the constitution of social 
reality by making meaning.”53 These relationships and processes are ascertained 
through the structured and systematic analysis of texts.54 In discourse analysis, texts 
may be written texts, spoken words, visual representations, and physical artifacts. 
 Texts are the sites of the emergence of complexes of social meanings, 
produced in the particular history of the situation of production, that 
record in partial ways the histories of both the participants in the 
production of the text and of the institutions that are “invoked” or 
brought into play, indeed a partial history of the language and the social 
system, a partiality due to the structurings of relations of power of the 
participants.55 
In this way, discourse analysis is a means by which the meanings actors assign to 
phenomena, the possibilities of action they perceive, and the relationships between 
actors, discourses, and social reality can be discovered. This is accomplished through 
the “retroduction of a discourse through the empirical analysis of its realization in 
practices.”56 According to Laffey and Weldes, discourse analysis “reasons backward” 
through texts within a particular discourse to “establish structure from its empirical 
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manifestations” and examines how such a discourse is “naturalized in such a way as to 
become taken for granted.”57 
Discourse analysis, as a self-consciously constructivist method, entails a set of 
assumptions rooted in an understanding of social reality as continuously constructed 
and reconstructed through interactions, which are themselves informed and constrained 
by norms and institutions. Indeed, some scholars argue that discourse analysis cannot be 
divorced from its theoretical foundations and, therefore, must be understood as a 
methodology, rather than a method.58 In discourse analysis, “the nature of being cannot 
be separated from ways of knowing.”59 It is important, therefore, to highlight here the 
theoretical commitments and assumptions of discourse analysis, as these inform and 
constrain the researcher’s decision making. 
 Discourses and the social world are co-constitutive. That is, even as discourses 
are shaped by the realities they describe, they also influence interlocutors’ application 
of meaning to these realities and constrain how they are perceived. As Milliken 
explains, “things do not mean (the material world does not convey meaning); rather, 
people construct the meaning of things” using a system of signification, a discourse.60 
In this way, discourses construct social realities, but they are also constructed by them. 
Elements of discourse like meanings and categorizations are ‘social, not natural 
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kinds.’61 These elements originate in the wider context of a discourse and are then 
reproduced, reimagined, and redefined through the filter of meaning constituted by 
discourse. 
 Discourses produce norms that constrain behavior. Milliken explains, “Beyond 
giving a language for speaking about phenomena, discourses make intelligible some 
ways of being in, and acting towards, the world, and of operationalizing a particular 
regime of truth while excluding other possible modes of identity and action.”62 
Discourses exert normative force on behavior by limiting possibilities of meaning of 
objects and events, selecting out certain perspectives, for example, by delimiting the 
bounds of what is taken for granted as common sense. These limits are produced 
intersubjectively through interaction and become taken for granted through repetition. 
In this way, even actors themselves are in part constituted by the routinized practices in 
which they engage.63 Discourses work to constitute actors by changing actors’ 
perceptions of their own interests and even altering political situations, producing 
changes in actors’ material capabilities.64 
 Discourses are unstable. Because discourses are produced and reproduced 
through interactions and depend upon repetition and context, they change. They require 
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work to “articulate and rearticulate their knowledges and identities…making discourses 
changeable and in fact historically contingent.”65  
Common Criticisms 
 Some international relations scholars have criticized discourse scholarship as 
bad science, claiming a lack of testable theories or empirical analyses.66 Addressing this 
criticism, Milliken rightly points to developments in discourse scholarship that have 
strengthened the method over time. These developments include the specification of 
various analytic approaches and strategies and, “via a growing number of substantive 
empirical analyses, the development of both theoretical concepts for and critical 
readings of International Relations.”67 Furthermore, as Milliken notes, discourse 
scholarship is not as abnormal a research program as detractors argue. As with other 
methods, discourse analysts engage with the work of scholars considered important for 
the research program and build their work upon certain theoretical commitments 
(described above) that inform and constrain means of discovery and justification.68  
Another common criticism of discourse analysis is the notion that this method 
lacks rigor. This criticism arises from the method’s lack of standardized, systematic 
procedures, which are often found in the natural sciences and quantitative research in 
the social sciences. In response, some discourse analysts contend that a major advantage 
of discourse analysis is that it self-consciously avoids the reification of concepts and 
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objects, which more systematic and mechanical techniques characteristic of other 
methods fail to address.69 Phillips and Hardy agree, adding that more systematic and 
labor-saving methods, like content analysis, are detrimental to the aim of discourse 
analysis because they seek to rapidly consolidate categories, whereas discourse analysis 
seeks to draw existing categorizations from texts.70 Milliken adds to this defense, 
arguing that discourse analysis is more “critically self-aware of the closures imposed” 
by research methods and techniques of analysis that scholars frequently use. 
Furthermore, though discourse analysis does not impose upon the researcher a single, 
standardized analytical framework, scholars who utilize the method have produced a 
plethora of work outlining various analytical strategies.71 This allows the researcher to 
choose the strategy or combination of strategies that best suits the project.  
Finally, some scholars claim that discourse analysis is too subjective, that the 
analyst brings subjective interpretations or perceptions to the coding of texts.72 In fact, it 
is this imposition of the analyst’s preconceptions on the data that discourse analysis 
helps to minimize. Rather than choosing themes or categories to search for within a text, 
the analyst engages with texts in a two or multi stage process in which he or she first 
identifies the existing themes and patterns within the texts and then goes about coding 
the data. As Fierke explains, “The appearance and frequency of a particular grammar is 
not down to the interpretation of the analyst. These patterns emerge across texts and are 
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discovered by the analyst [emphasis added].”73 While this means that discourse analysis 
is more time consuming than some other methods, the time and labor invested help to 
ensure more accurate findings with regard to the discursive patterns at work in a 
particular discourse or an intersection of discourses.  
 While the strengths of discourse analysis help to address many criticisms of the 
method, these strengths come at a cost. Discourses comprise sets of meanings that 
change over time with context, and it is difficult to know with certainty the limits of a 
particular discourse. That is, discourses are part of open social systems.74 The meaning 
of a particular word or phrase within a specific discourse is dependent upon 
relationships between relevant texts, discourses, and contexts. This means that the 
analyst must be cautious in drawing generalized conclusions from the findings of a 
discourse analysis.75 Rather than attempting to make results more generalizable, the 
discourse analyst accepts the changing nature of discourses and contexts and limits 
claims to the spatial and temporal context of the sample. This study, for example, draws 
conclusions specific to Israeli policymaking regarding security in the Intifada period 
without making claims about Israeli policymaking at other times or policymaking 
elsewhere. The following details the specific application of discourse analysis to this 
study. 
The Current Study 
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 This study applies elements of the approaches of social linguistic analysis and 
interpretive structuralism to the analysis of interviews, political speeches, and news 
articles. Social linguistic analysis entails a close reading of texts to discover the 
rhetorical strategies used to construct a decision.76 While social linguistic analysis 
emphasizes a close analysis of texts themselves, interpretive structuralism focuses on 
how interlocutors interpret the context within which decisions are made, thereby 
discerning the subjective interpretations of the plausibility of policy options.77 The 
present study combines strategies from these approaches to discover how the violence 
of the Second Intifada was perceived by the Israeli public and the Israeli leadership and 
how this perception impacted the discursive construction of the West Bank barrier 
policy.  
 The data for this study was collected and analyzed in five stages. First, the 
researcher conducted a series of interviews in Israel in the summer of 2017 with the 
approval of the Institutional Review Board. The researcher interviewed two Knesset 
Members, two Knesset advisors, one local political scientist, and two influential 
political journalists. Preliminary analysis of this data provided the working categories 
for future stages of analysis. These preliminary categories were: Jewish national 
identity, democratic national identity, and security exceptionalism. It should be noted 
here that, because these interviews were conducted many years after the construction of 
the West Bank barrier and, therefore, were several years removed from the discursive 
context of interest here, the categories produced by these interviews were then tested 
against the second round of data.  
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 The second round of data collection explored the contextual factors pertinent to 
the state’s decision to construct the West Bank barrier. Political speeches and 
documents from 2000 to 2005 by Knesset members, government ministries, 
ambassadors, and spokespersons for state agencies provided the raw data for a predicate 
and rhetorical analysis of the perceived threats to physical and ontological security 
during the Second Intifada. Using NVIVO software as a coding tool, this analysis 
identified two major contextual categories: othering and selective legitimation of 
violence. While the analysis did reveal a recurring theme of anxiety around the Jewish 
national identity, perceived threat to the democratic national identity is notably absent 
from this discourse.  
 While government documents and speeches were useful to uncover the 
dominant positions within government regarding the violence of the Second Intifada, 
wider public discourse was necessary to ascertain the extent to which ideas and themes 
in government discourse was reflected in the popular discourse and to then further 
refine categories. In this third stage of data collection, the researcher compiled entries 
and articles from blogs and news sources local to Israel and analyzed these using 
NVIVO software. Similar themes of otherizing, selective legitimation, and Jewish 
national identity characterized this data. By comparing these themes with those of the 
previous stage, the researcher was able to discern the diffusion of ideas between 
government and non-government sources. 
 The fourth and fifth stages of this analysis incorporated the processes and 
categories of stages two and three. Whereas stages two and three focused on the 
discursive construction of violence in the Second Intifada, stages four and five focused 
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on the discursive construction of the West Bank barrier policy itself. In the fourth stage, 
the researcher analyzed government documents and speeches, uncovering themes of 
national identity in the debate around the barrier policy decision. Then, in the fifth 
stage, the researcher applied this analytical strategy to blog posts, news articles, and op-
eds and comparing discursive themes to assess the flow of ideas in the construction of 
the barrier policy decision in the public discourse.  
The design of this study allowed the researcher to uncover evidence of 
ontological insecurity not only in the discursive construction of the Second Intifada, but 
also of the West Bank barrier as a policy decision. Additionally, this design provided a 
more complete understanding of the exchange of ideas between the political parties, as 
well as between the Israeli government and Israeli general public. Finally, by examining 
the discourse on the Second Intifada violence and the West Bank barrier policy 
separately, the researcher was able to discern the impact of the Intifada on this policy 
decision. The following chapter provides a detailed discussion of ontological security, 
and the results of this study are presented in the third chapter. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
A state’s need for physical security is taken for granted in international relations. 
Indeed, the need for states to secure their respective territories and structures of 
governance speaks to our conceptualization of states and, along with them, the nature of 
the international system. As Wendt argues, however, states have both physical and 
social drives.78 The physical attributes of a state, such as its territory and governance 
structures are not the only referent objects a state seeks to secure. States also seek to 
secure their identities in the international system. That is, states seek ontological, as 
well as physical security. As acts of political violence can threaten the physical security 
of a state, so too can such acts threaten a state’s ontological security. The purpose of 
this chapter is to elaborate ontological security theory, especially as it applies to 
international relations, and to unpack the co-constitutive relationships between national 
identity, routines, discourse, and critical situations to explicate how ontological 
insecurity might make palatable previously unacceptable policy options. In the 
following section, I elaborate the individual’s social-psychological need for ontological 
security. Then, I extrapolate ontological security to the state level. The final section 
explores one application of this theory to the state of Israel and its decision to erect the 
West Bank barrier and problematizes some of its assumptions.    
THE HUMAN NEED FOR ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY 
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Ontological security is defined by Giddens as “a sense of continuity and order in 
events.”79 This sense of continuity only exists when the individual experiences himself 
or herself as whole and continuous in time, allowing the individual to realize his or her 
sense of agency.80 This means that an individual, in order to realize a sense of agency, 
must have a continuous conceptualization of self. Mitzen explains this relationship 
between self and agency: 
[A]gency requires a stable cognitive environment. Where 
an actor has no idea what to expect, she cannot 
systematically relate ends to means, and it becomes 
unclear how to pursue her ends. Since ends are 
constitutive of identity, in turn, deep uncertainty renders 
the actor’s identity insecure. Individuals are therefore 
motivated to create cognitive and behavioral certainty, 
which they do by establishing routines.81 
 
Actors construct stable cognitive environments through behavioral certainty, established 
and maintained through routines, which function to construct and affirm the actors’ 
identities. Ontological insecurity, then, obtains when “individuals are uncomfortable 
with who they are, more specifically [when] they are uncomfortable with their identity 
as social (inter)actors.”82 Identity is central to ontological security.  
Identity 
 For the purposes of this work, I find Hopf and Allan’s definition of identity 
satisfactory. They define an identity as “how one understands oneself in relationship to 
another.”83 This definition points to two important aspects of the nature of identity: the 
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salience of perception to identity and the inherent nature of identity as socially 
constructed. An individual’s identity is not simply assigned to him by his interlocutors. 
Nor is it chosen solely by the individual. An identity is constructed intersubjectively and 
is dependent upon the individual’s perceptions of himself, his internally constructed 
biographical narrative, as well as his interlocutors’ perceptions of him, what he appears 
to be. These perceptions are informed and constrained by the normative structures of the 
social environment. Consider an aspiring fashion model who supports himself by 
working at his local department store until he can secure a modeling contract. Although 
he may consider himself a model, his community and the fashion industry may not, 
likely regarding him as a salesperson instead. Is he a model or a salesperson? According 
to Hopf and Allan’s definition, it depends on his relationship to others. If his 
relationships to others involve routines that reinforce his identity as a model, such as 
meeting with designers for fittings, scheduling photoshoots, or taking part in runway 
shows, his identity as a model is supported in those relationships. Conversely, if his 
routines involve helping customers, styling displays, and stocking inventory, his 
identity as a salesperson is supported in those respective relationships. This leads to an 
important characteristic of identities: they can change. Maintaining or changing 
identities is achieved through routines.  
Routines 
 Routines, the “internally programmed cognitive and behavioral responses to 
information or stimuli, make social life and the self knowable.84 While some routines 
are exclusively personal, social relationships are the most important source of routines. 
Routinized responses are habitual and require no conscious decision between options or 
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deliberate weighing of information. They are taken-for-granted and inoculate the 
individual against the paralyzing knowledge that, underneath the routinized responses to 
our daily lives, “chaos lurks.”85 The individual does not weigh his options and their 
potential consequences in routines, thereby creating a “cognitive cocoon” or “basic trust 
system” which enables actors to “trust that their cognitive world will be reproduced”.86 
Let us return to our hypothetical fashion model/salesperson. While working in the 
department store, he does not critically evaluate his relationship to a customer or his 
responses to her. When she asks for assistance, he does not carefully weigh his options 
for response. His options are informed and constrained by his identity as a salesperson 
in this particular relationship; his response, routinized, will be in line with his identity as 
a salesperson, thereby reinforcing it. Conversely, if his identity as a model remains 
unsupported by routines while his identity as a salesperson continues to be reinforced in 
his daily interactions, the latter will become more central to his conceptualization of 
self.  
 Because routines affirm and support identity and stabilize their cognitive 
environments, actors become attached to their routines and the relationships in which 
they exist. Abandoning a relationship and the routines through which it is maintained 
would entail sacrificing the stability of an identity, thereby paralyzing the individual’s 
capacity to act, to realize his agency.87 It is important to note that the nature of the 
relationship and, therefore, the content of the identity it supports is often immaterial to 
the individual’s attachment to it. That is, actors may develop attachments to healthy as 
well as unhealthy routines. Additionally, because routines depend upon interlocutors 
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responding according to shared rules and norms defined by the relationship, i.e. 
predictably, “the self-conceptions that motivate intentional action cannot always be 
reinforced.”88 External factors such as environmental changes, a breakdown of 
intersubjective meaning in crisis, or the interventions of powerful outside actors 
influence how an individual’s actions are perceived and, in turn, the response they 
evoke. An actor’s self-conception, therefore, cannot always be affirmed. In such a case, 
the actor may develop attachment to a set of relationships and routines that support a 
less preferred identity.89 This means that ontological security-seeking may result in an 
actor adopting an identity that is not necessarily his desired identity. Adopting such a 
“second-best” identity does not produce ontological insecurity, as the routines in which 
the individual participates do not require the actor to consciously scrutinize his behavior 
against a preferred identity. Rather, they support the same basic trust system mentioned 
above that allows the actor to perceive his social environment and himself as knowable 
and, therefore, actionable. Ontological security-seeking, then, is the “drive to minimize 
hard uncertainty by imposing cognitive order on the environment.90 
Ontological Insecurity and Critical Situations 
 At the individual level, ontological insecurity is rarely evidenced, so profound is 
our attachment to routines and our need for ontological security. It is in cases of trauma, 
when the cognitive-affective ordering of the social environment is interrupted, that 
ontological insecurity arises. Mitzen defines ontological insecurity as the “deep, 
incapacitating state of not knowing which dangers to confront and which to ignore.”91 
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This definition highlights the fundamental relationship between identity and agency. In 
a state of ontological insecurity, an individual cannot systematically draw connections 
between means and ends, impeding her ability to evaluate options and to plan ahead. 
She cannot confidently rely upon predictable routines. Giddens refers to such instances 
as “critical situations.”  
 Critical situations are “circumstances of a radical disjuncture of an unpredictable 
kind which affect substantial numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy 
the certitudes of institutionalized routines.”92 Such situations critically damage an 
actor’s ability to trust his or her knowledge of the social environment and to act 
accordingly. Such confusion and paralysis engender insecurity. Steele explains the 
resulting insecurity as a discomfort with who one is, specifically a discomfort with 
one’s identity as a social (inter)actor.93 The actor’s experience with such insecurity is 
one of anxiety. Giddens distinguishes fear from anxiety, explaining that fear is ‘a 
response to a specific threat and therefore has a definite object, while anxiety is 
characterized by ‘a generalised state of the emotions of the given individual” resulting 
from a challenge to the individual’s identity.94 An actor suffering from anxiety in such a 
case is insecure, presenting a ‘failure to develop or sustain trust in his own self-
integrity,” subjecting his thoughts and behavior to “constant scrutiny.”95 This constant 
scrutiny degrades the integrity of the individual’s basic trust system as routines give 
way to unpredictable responses that fail to reaffirm the individual’s identity. 
Additionally, as the individual can no longer connect means to ends in a predictable and 
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knowable social reality, he may choose a course of action that is incompatible with his 
identity.  
Such incongruence results in what Giddens refers to as shame. Unlike guilt, 
which is the product of a fear of transgression, shame is a more private feeling of 
insecurity resulting from the perception of having behaved in a way that is incompatible 
with the individual’s self-identity.96 That is, while guilt is an emotional response to the 
violation of an intersubjectively held rule or norm, shame is the emotional response to 
the violation of one’s sense of self. This section has outlined the social-psychological 
foundations of ontological security-seeking, including the intersubjective nature of 
identity, the salience of routines and relationships to basic trust systems, the ways in 
which critical situations engender ontological insecurity, and the importance of shame 
to such insecurity. In the following section, I extrapolate the concept of ontological 
security to the state level before exploring its application to the state of Israel.  
 
THE STATE AS ONTOLOGICAL SECURITY-SEEKER 
Like the need for physical security, the state’s need for ontological security is 
extrapolated from the individual level. This is not, however, a sufficient point to argue 
that states seek ontological security; further justification is needed. To that end, Mitzen 
offers three helpful defenses for states as ontological security-seekers. First, she points 
out that international relations scholars’ tendency to assume that states need physical 
security is not entirely unproblematic vis-à-vis anthropomorphizing the state:  physical 
security-seeking assumes that states have physical bodies or some such analog that may 
be harmed or die. Such analogs, however, like states’ territory, citizens, or sovereignty 
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are imperfect, as they are either not exactly physical or, as in the case of territory, it is 
unclear how much of it a state may lose and maintain its status as a state.97 If we can 
accept such ambiguity and take for granted the state’s need for physical security, the 
notion that a state as a social actor might have other human needs is not altogether far-
fetched. 
Secondly, as argued in the previous section, individuals require cognitive 
stability in order to secure their identities. Therefore, individuals become attached to 
stable group identities such as a national identity, meaning that the ontological security 
needs of citizens influence the identity of the group as one that also needs ontological 
security.98 “Because losing a sense of state distinctiveness would threaten the 
ontological security of its members, states can be seen as motivated to preserve the 
national group identity and not simply the national ‘body.’”99 This defense of states as 
ontological security-seekers is particularly helpful, as it highlights the nature of the state 
not as a conscious monolith possessed of human qualities, but as simply a social group. 
Conceptualizing the state as a social group leaves room for considerations of ingroup 
and outgroup behavior, which is particularly helpful to uncovering national identities, as 
such identities are performed in these ingroup/outgroup relationships.  
A final justification for conceptualizing states as ontological security-seekers is 
its explanatory value. The nature of states as corporate actors, Mitzen argues, can 
reproduce macro-level outcomes across decision-makers that are inconsistent with the 
assumptions of other explanatory models, such as those put forth by neorealists.100 That 
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is, states exhibit patterns of behavior across time (or administrations) that cannot be 
explained in terms of the individual decisionmaker’s identity or in terms of the state’s 
need for physical security in an anarchic international system characterized by unequal 
capabilities between actors. While any theorist who undertakes to apply 
anthropomorphic attributes to states must contend with the issue of state personhood, as 
Wendt cautions, such a practice may provide as much heuristic value to the 
understanding of states as ontological security-seekers as it does to the understanding of 
states as physical security-seekers.101 As mentioned above, however, problems 
associated with anthropomorphizing the state are mitigated by the conceptualization of 
the state as a social group.   
Ontological Security and National Identity 
Whereas physical security is security as survival, ontological security is 
“security as being”102 McSweeney utilizes this concept of security as being, and he 
explains this as “confidence in an actor’s capacity to manage relations with others.”103 
Relations between actors at the state level, like those at the individual level, are 
informed and constrained by the actors’ social environment. This means that the 
environment impacts a state’s sense of ontological security as well as physical security. 
McSweeney explains: 
If we assume, with Robert Gilpin, that wherever we live 
we live in a jungle, then it is reasonable to conclude that it 
is complacency rather than rational assessment not to 
elevate physical survival to the highest rank in the 
hierarchy of human needs. Conversely, it is paranoia to 
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organise our lives on that assumption without compelling 
evidence to support it.104 
 
The aforementioned conceptualization of security as strictly survival, then, rests on the 
assumption that the state exists in a jungle, i.e. an anarchical international system. 
Because the state is a social actor, however, it follows that the state would have social, 
rather than strictly physical, needs. A secure national identity is a social need. 
Furthermore, as argued above, a state is a social group, meaning that its identity (and, 
therefore, its interests) are constructed by its individual members even as it informs 
their identities.105  
Just as states have social objectives as part of their nature as corporate social 
actors, they also possess identities. Recall that an identity is how one understands 
oneself in relation to another. Building on this basic understanding of an identity, Hopf 
and Allan define national identity as “a constellation of categories that define the nation 
or what it means to be a member of a nation.”106 These sets of categories are 
“constituted by societal discourses that are shaped by and constrain individuals who 
draw on shared knowledge to form their personal identities.”107 Such a definition has 
several implications. First, it implies that national identities and societal discourses are 
co-constitutive. Intersubjective knowledge informs and constrains interactions, which, 
as outlined above, construct and maintain identities when routinized. Second, this 
definition implies that the same routines and intersubjective knowledge that inform 
individual identities also inform national identities. This logic is consistent with 
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Mitzen’s conceptualization of group identity as arising from individuals’ self-identities 
as members of such group.108 Finally, the definition implies that discourses, as products 
of intersubjective meaning, are co-constitutive of routines and, as such, work to order 
the social environment. 
It is important to note that, as states’ identities are constructed as collective 
identities through intersubjectively held knowledge of individuals, states’ identities are 
not fixed, and states may have more than one identity. In part, discourses of national 
identity are sets of “categories that individuals use to understand the nation and 
themselves as members of a country.”109 As a state’s identity is partly constructed and 
maintained by individuals’ conceptions of the state and what it means to be a member 
of it, such an identity is subject to change as one discourse yields hegemony to another. 
Berger and Luckmann’s approach to identity elaborates this important aspect of 
identity. They argue that individuals perceive the social world through categories 
acquired from intersubjectively shared knowledge.110 These categories exert a 
normative force on discourse, limiting the possibilities of interpretation to that 
knowledge that is intersubjectively shared within the group. 111  
Routines, which they call “habits,” are the mechanisms through which the range 
of choice in social interaction is narrowed.112 The dependence of discourse on routines 
means that, if certain routines are interrupted or replaced by others, the discourses that 
depended upon them change or give way to discourses that are supported by the new 
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routines. Finally, as identity is dependent upon routines performed within relationships, 
a state has multiple identities that become salient in different relationships. Hopf and 
Allan explain, “an identity is how one understands oneself in relationship to another,” 
and “any individual or state has multiple identities because its identity is different in 
interaction with different others.”113 
Relationships and Routines 
 The previous section outlined the importance of relationships and routines to 
individual identity. At the state level, relationships and routines are no less important. 
States’ identities are constructed and reaffirmed through the discursive performance of 
the self-identities of individuals as members of that state, their conceptualizations of 
what that state is, and intersubjectively shared knowledge of what it means to be a 
member of that state. “Discourses of national identity,” as Hopf and Allan explain, 
“contain multiple elements of identity. These discourses are generated both by ruling 
elites at the level of the state and in society as a whole, as well as in interactions with 
other states.”114 That is, national identity discourses are also constructed in the 
performance of routines in relationships between states. This understanding is supported 
by our conceptualization of the state as a social group. A significant means by which 
groups maintain distinct identities is through routinized relationships with other 
groups.115  
 Like individual identities are affirmed through interactions between individuals, 
so too are national identities affirmed through interactions between states. States 
perform their identities in interactions with other states, and those states respond in 
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ways that reaffirm or challenge that identity. These identities are performed through 
state actions, especially with regard to other states. Mitzen explains that, as social 
groups, states have intrinsic as well as role identities.116 Intrinsic identities are those 
constellations of categories of meaning that define the state, as well as membership in it, 
which are intersubjectively constructed by members of the social group. Intrinsic 
identities, according to Mitzen, can be maintained alone, while role identities are 
dependent upon the group’s relationship with other groups to sustain them.117 I argue, 
however, that an intrinsic identity is one phase of a two-phase identity that is dependent 
upon a state’s relationships with other states to maintain. As explained above, identities 
are dependent upon routines and relationships to maintain. While the members of a 
social group may intersubjectively construct identities for the group, that group’s 
identity in relation to other groups is necessarily constitutive of other groups’ responses 
to it. Mitzen argues that, like intrinsic identities, role identities are internalized and 
motivate group action, but unlike intrinsic identities, “role identities get their meaning 
from role positions in the social order and therefore are not understandable in terms of 
qualities individuals have alone.”118 In interaction, other states draw conclusions from a 
state’s behavior as to the role that behavior constitutes and regard the state as fulfilling 
that role.119 More importantly, once this state is regarded by others as fulfilling a certain 
role, those other states will treat that state accordingly, thereby engaging in 
relationships that may be routinized to support that identity. 
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 This view of the relationship between the role identity and intrinsic identity is 
consistent with George Herbert Mead’s understanding of the self as having two phases 
in social action. The role identity situates and defines the actor in relation to the actor’s 
social context; this identity is comprised of a set of routines and relationships that define 
the actor as an object of social experience. Mead regards the stage of the self that is the 
social object as the “Me”.120 The role identity (the “Me”), is internalized. For a state, 
this means that the internal discourse evinces an elite/mass consensus, a presumable 
taken-for-grantedness.121 The role identity becomes part of the state’s intrinsic identity, 
motivating future social behavior (the “I”).122 Once the actions of the “I” are objectified 
and recognized by interlocutors, those behaviors become part of the social object, the 
“Me.” In this way, we can understand intrinsic and role identities of the state as two 
phases of a dialectical relationship. 
Some international relations scholars understand state action as serving rational 
and material interests, i.e. as following the “logic of consequences.”123 Interests, 
however, cannot be strictly material. As interests and identities are co-constitutive, all 
interests derive from a state’s identity in relation to another in a given context. Hopf and 
Allan argue that states may, therefore, adhere to three additional logics: States may 
follow the “logic of appropriateness,” meaning they choose a certain action because it is 
consistent with their identities; they may also adopt the “logic of affect,” meaning they 
choose an action specifically to evoke affective feelings toward other states; finally, 
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states may follow the logic of habit, i.e. performing routinized behaviors 
unreflectively.124  
Taken with our understanding of the co-constitutive relationships between 
identity, interests, and routines, however, I argue that the three logics proposed by Hopf 
and Allen are not necessarily distinct from one another under normal conditions. That 
is, barring the previously discussed “critical situations,” wherein state actors may be 
forced to choose between actions that adhere to an identity and actions that produce 
affect, these three logics function as essentially a single logic. This is especially clear 
when one remembers that the successful performance of national identity always 
follows the “logic of habit,” as identities must be supported by routines.  
Attachment 
As mentioned in the preceding section, individuals develop attachment to 
routines that support their identities, whether those routines are healthy or not. This is 
also true for states. Consider a state that evinces an identity as a physical security-seeker 
in its discourse but behaves as though it is seeking conflict by rejecting gestures from 
other states, missing opportunities for diplomacy, or issuing threats of its own. A realist 
might consider this behavior irrational. Ontological security, however, might explain 
this behavior as a rational attachment to a set of routines that support an identity and 
provide the state with the certainty required to render its social world knowable. As 
Mitzen explains, “states can become attached to physically dangerous relationships and 
unable, or unwilling, to learn their way out.”125 A state’s ability to learn its way out of 
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dangerous routines and into more desirable alternatives depends upon its mode of 
attachment. 
While all social actors routinize their relationships, they vary in what Mitzen 
refers to as their “modes of attachment.”126 A state may be attached to its routines 
rigidly or reflexively, and the state’s mode of attachment is evidenced by the state’s 
reaction to uncertainty. A state with a reflexive mode of attachment can tolerate 
uncertainty and even some ontological insecurity, regarding disruption to routines as 
temporary.127 Such a social group trusts the stability of the social environment. This 
enables the state to make room for new or unexpected information, to respond flexibly, 
and even restructure relationships as necessary. Thus, a state with a reflexive mode of 
attachment has a “healthy basic trust system,” and, therefore, a greater capacity to 
pursue interests beyond physical security. 
Conversely, a state with a rigid mode of attachment treats routines as ends in 
themselves, valuing the routines rather than the identities they support. For such a state, 
even temporary disruptions are perceived as threatening, and the response is to rigidly 
adhere to routines in extreme avoidance of uncertainty.128 Such an actor has an 
unhealthy basic trust system, so, while action is possible, it is internally limited. 
Because learning requires the disruption of routines, the state with a rigid mode of 
attachment has a reduced capacity to learn.129 When routines are rigidly held, disruption 
of routines makes the state vulnerable to ontological insecurity. Therefore, a state may 
rigidly cling to an adversarial relationship in an extreme avoidance of the uncertainty 
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engendered by the disruption of routines. Mitzen uses the example of an unsupported 
security-seeker identity to illuminate this attachment: 
[I]f the cocoon of routines providing a state with basic trust does 
not support its possible self, it will develop a basic trust system 
that supports a less desired self, the competitor rather than the 
security-seeker. It did not intend to be a competitor, and indeed 
may maintain security-seeking aspirations in principle, but once 
ontological security needs are met through relationships that 
sustain competition, those aspirations are effectively insulated 
from practice.130 
 
Once such an identity is internalized by the social group’s members, the state will then 
reject future opportunities to establish new routines that support its once-preferred 
identity as security-seeker, strictly averse to the insecurity and uncertainty inherent in 
the construction of new routines. In this section, I have extrapolated the social-
psychological theory of ontological security to the state level, explained the nature of 
the state as a social group, and explored how states might maintain ontological security 
and respond to ontological insecurity. In the following section, I detail one application 
of this theory to the case of the state of Israel and its decision to construct the West 
Bank barrier and problematize some of the argument’s assumptions.  
ONTOLOGICAL DISSONANCE? ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK BARRIER 
 In a 2012 article, Lupovici conceptualizes what he calls ontological dissonance 
at the state level and tests this concept against the case of Israel’s policy responses to 
the Second Intifada. He is concerned with situations in which a state may face threats to 
more than one of its identities, specifically cases in which the solutions to these threats 
are contradictory. In such cases, the state faces a choice between its identities. Lupovici 
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argues that, in these cases, avoidance may provide an attractive alternative.131 He then 
applies this theoretical framework to Israel’s policy decisions in the wake of the Second 
Intifada. The Intifada, he argues, amounted to a critical situation in which a number of 
Israel’s identities were threatened in such a way as to emphasize incompatibilities 
between these identities.132 Avoidance, then, in the shape of the West Bank barrier as 
part of Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan became the most attractive option. Using 
discourse analysis, Lupovici identifies the Israeli identities salient to the social situation 
and explains how the Intifada threatened each. This section discusses ontological 
dissonance and evaluates its application to this case. 
Ontological Dissonance 
 Lupovici describes ontological dissonance as a type of ontological insecurity in 
which multiple state identities are threatened and “there is conflict between the 
measures that must be taken to resolve the various threats, aggravating the threat to each 
of the challenged identities.”133 That is, ontological dissonance obtains when more than 
one identity is threatened, and the action aimed to secure one identity threatens another. 
Particularly salient to his conceptualization of ontological dissonance is the perception 
on the part of the state that the actions necessary to resolve the threat to each identity 
are themselves in conflict. This conceptualization has several important implications. 
First, it implies that states can hold identities that are incompatible with one another. 
The co-constitutive connection between routinized relationships and identity supports 
this implication. As long as the routines that order the state’s social world and make it 
knowable remain stable, a state need not scrutinize them. Furthermore, each of a state’s 
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incongruous identities can be supported by multiple different relationships 
simultaneously. Second, it suggests that critical situations can bring these 
incompatibilities to the fore, causing insecurity. The salience of routines also supports 
this. In a critical situation, a social actor’s routines are disrupted, opening the actor’s 
once automatic modes of relating and, therefore, its identities, to scrutiny. Such 
scrutiny, as Giddens warns, exposes the underlying chaos heretofore obscured by the 
actor’s basic trust system.134 Third, Lupovici’s conceptualization of ontological 
dissonance implies that ontological dissonance is not an objective condition of a state 
but is instead experienced by the state as uncertainty. This emphasis on perception is 
consistent with ontological security theory, but does the discourse evince the perception 
that an ontological dissonance existed during the Second Intifada? The results of this 
study, explicated in the following chapter, suggest otherwise. While some uncertainty 
did exist around whether the means to address the security-seeking identity of the state 
were congruous with the Jewish national identity, attempts to approve construction of 
the West Bank barrier were not successful until the policy was discursively constructed 
as a solution to the anxiety around the Jewish national identity as well.  
 Lupovici argues that one attractive option for states experiencing ontological 
dissonance is avoidance, though this is a maladaptive response. Avoidance, he explains, 
“is a mechanism that perpetuates and sustains conflicts, as it may undermine an actor’s 
sensitivity to new information and its ability to respond to it.”135 He compares this 
option to two others. In addition to avoidance, a state may reconstruct its identity or 
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change its behavior.136 He argues that states’ attachment to their identities makes it 
difficult for them to implement behavioral or identity changes.137 I would argue, 
however, that it is an actor’s attachment to routines, as outlined in the previous section, 
that determines its ability to change identity or behavior. Recall that a state that is 
reflexively attached to routines can learn and, therefore, incorporate new information 
and tolerate the mild insecurity necessary to changing routines. Conversely, a state that 
is rigidly attached has a reduced capacity to incorporate new information and establish 
new routines. Therefore, we can expect rigidly attached actors to have maladaptive 
responses to critical situations. Another option for addressing ontological dissonance is 
discursive justification. According to Sandholtz, states exist in a system of overlapping, 
and often conflicting, sets of rules, creating vastly more possibilities for justificatory 
behavior than simple cases in which only one rule set applies.138 In such complex cases, 
states must navigate conflicting rule sets by justifying their behavior in terms of these 
rules, where one rule may negate another and vice versa. This justificatory behavior is 
evident in ontological security crises, as well, which is shown in the following chapter. 
A state may address threats to its identities by arguing that its behavior and questioned 
identity are not, in fact, in conflict. 
Nevertheless, the option of avoidance does provide heuristic value. Let us again 
return to our model/salesperson. Suppose that, after many years of maintaining his 
identities as a model and a salesperson, performing the salesperson identity through 
everyday relations with customers and a promotion to team leader, and performing the 
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model identity through the occasional small job with a local designer, he is faced with a 
threat to both of these identities. Suppose the store where he works as a salesperson 
closes permanently and his supervisor offers him a position in another city. Here, the 
course of action that will secure one identity threatens another. To avoid actively 
choosing one identity over another, he may choose instead to leave the city and move 
back home with his parents, creating a comfortable ambiguity around the identity threat 
by telling himself that he will get back on his feet and try again sometime in the future.  
Lupovici applies these concepts to the case of Israel and the construction of the 
West Bank barrier, arguing that the Second Intifada created an ontological dissonance 
between Israel’s identities as a Jewish state, as a security provider, and as a democracy. 
He argues that the violence of the Second Intifada was perceived to be threatened and 
that the attacks actually strengthened the Jewish identity of the state.139 The threat he 
identifies is the “demographic threat,” i.e. the fear that a growing Palestinian population 
may diminish the Jewish-Israeli majority. Lupovici also rightly points out that the threat 
to the Jewish identity of the state is also understood by Israelis “in the context of the 
lack of clearly defined borders.”140 Borders, he argues, serve a social group’s sense of 
affiliation and belonging. 
Lupovici also argues that the Israeli national identity as security provider was 
threatened by the Second Intifada. Israel, he explains, conceives of itself to be in a 
hostile political environment, which is reinforced by collective memory of the 
Holocaust and perceptions of the Palestinian issue as an existential threat.141 During the 
Intifada years, in which Israel experienced several failures of its general deterrence 
                                                 
139 Lupovici, 822.  
140 Ibid., 823. 
141 Ibid., 824. 
50 
 
strategy toward Palestinians, the state’s perceived failure to provide security had a 
greater impact than a mere physical security threat. It challenged the state’s ontological 
security by undermining the state’s security routines. In the following chapter, I argue 
that Israel’s security-seeker identity is not so simple, as it is underpinned by a carefully 
maintained self-concept of security exceptionalism and ingroup identification with the 
international community. It was not, therefore, merely the disruption of security 
routines that threatened this identity, but also the international community’s response to 
the measures initially taken by the IDF and the perception on the part of the Israeli 
public that the state was too conciliatory to the Palestinians, to the detriment of its 
citizens’ safety. 
Finally, Lupovici argues that the Second Intifada and the measures undertaken 
in response threatened Israel’s identity as a democracy. Israel’s actions toward its Arab 
minority, the occupation of Palestinian territories, and the incompatibility between 
Judaism and liberalism, according to Lupovici, threaten Israel’s democratic identity.142 
The routines of occupation, however, coexisted alongside the routines of the democratic 
identity through the 1967 war and the First Intifada in the 1980s and did not engender 
an avoidance strategy. Additionally, the incompatibility between Jewish nationalism 
and liberalism is only salient if Israel is a liberal democracy. Smooha argues that Israel 
is a non-liberal democracy and should be, instead, considered an ethnic democracy, 
which he defines as “a democratic system of government wherein rights are granted to 
all citizens while, concurrently, a favoured status is conferred upon the majority.”143 
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The ethnic democracy accepts both the principle of democracy for all and the 
conflicting principle of the majority’s structural subordination of the minority. In the 
case of Israel, this means that the state is a means for furthering the interests and social 
objectives of the Jewish majority while the Arab minority cannot identify with the 
national identity.144 Smooha recognizes that such opposing principles engender 
intractable conflicts and dilemmas, but ongoing conflicts and dilemmas are perfectly 
consistent with ontological security theory. A rigid attachment mode, for example, can 
cause an actor to cling to adversarial relationships and routines of conflict. If Israel is 
indeed an ethnic democracy, the Jewish identity and the ethnic democratic identity 
would be supported by the same routines, drastically decreasing the likelihood that 
these two identities and the measures needed to secure them could be anything but 
congruous.  
Finally, Israel’s actions of exclusion toward its Arab minority may not be as 
incompatible with its democratic identity as Lupovici assumes. Pedahzur, quoting the 
Israeli High Court of Justice, argues that the state of Israel is a “defending democracy” 
and defines this as a state that “possesses an implied power, similar to self-defence, to 
fight against subversive attempts designed to destroy it.”145 He argues that a defending 
democracy may exclude from the democratic process groups who are perceived as 
endangering the state, its regime, or its national consensus.146 Because the state of Israel 
considers the routines of a defending democracy legitimate, weakening or excluding a 
demographic it sees as a threat to its political regime or basic national consensus is well 
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within its conceptualization of its democratic identity as an ethnic democracy with 
routines of a defending democracy and may, in fact, support it rather than threaten it.  
It is possible, then, that the Second Intifada threatened Israelis’ intersubjectively 
held national identities, engendering ontological insecurity, without necessarily creating 
conditions under which measures of resolution would be incompatible with other 
identities. The Likud party, which held a substantial public mandate at the time of the 
Second Intifada, might conceptualize democracy differently than Lupovici. If this is the 
case, and if this conceptualization is salient to the state’s decision-making with regard to 
the West Bank barrier, this understanding of the state’s democratic identity must be 
dominant in the discourse, and it must be perceived to be under threat. If it is dominant 
in the discourse but is not perceived to be under threat, this would suggest that the 
Likud party’s conceptualization of Israel’s democratic identity is compatible with the 
measures necessary to secure the state’s other identities, negating an ontological 
dissonance where this identity is concerned.  
In this chapter, I have detailed the theory of ontological security, incorporating 
social-psychological concepts of identity, routines, attachment, and critical situations. I 
then extrapolated these concepts to the state level, conceptualizing the state as a social 
group and a social actor, and defending the state as an ontological security-seeker. 
Finally, I outlined one application of this theory to the case of Israel and problematized 
Lupovici’s arguments for ontological dissonance and avoidance as explanations for 
Israel’s construction of the West Bank barrier. The following chapter details my 
empirical analysis of the discourses salient to the Israeli decision-making process during 
the Intifada years. I will discuss each identity threatened by the violence of the Intifada 
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and the role of ontological insecurity in the decision to construct the barrier, providing 
evidence of the identity threat in the discourse, as well as evidence of the discursive 
construction of the barrier as a solution to the ontological insecurity. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
This chapter details the results of analysis of 63 texts, comprised of 7 interviews, 
8 government reports, 41 news articles and op-eds, and 7 political speeches. Discourse 
analysis finds evidence of an ontological security crisis that threatened the identities of 
the state of Israel as a security-seeking state and a Jewish state. In contrast to Lupovici’s 
findings as outlined in the previous chapter, this analysis finds no significant evidence 
that the West Bank barrier was a measure of avoidance. While the evidence does 
suggest some insecurity around the state’s democratic identity, the discourse also shows 
that, following Sandholtz, this insecurity was largely mitigated through the discursive 
construction of the measures taken to secure the Jewish national identity as justified and 
in fact supported by the democratic national identity, especially in the eyes of political 
elites. This is largely due to a difference between Lupovici’s conceptualization of the 
Israeli democracy and that of the ruling party in the Israeli government (and indeed a 
large public consensus).  
Rather than an avoidance measure, this study finds that the barrier policy as part 
of Israel’s unilateral disengagement plan was eventually, after much discursive work, 
constructed as a direct solution to the ontological security threat to the state’s security-
seeking and Jewish identities. The following sections discuss the national identities 
present in the discourse, both how these identities were threatened by the Second 
Intifada and how each identity impacted and was impacted by the decision to erect the 
West Bank barrier. The salient identities evident in the political discourse surrounding 
the Intifada and the barrier policy decision, as also evident in Lupovici’s analysis, are 
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the security-seeking state identity, the Jewish national identity, and the democratic 
national identity, with some important conceptual differences to Lupovici’s analysis.  
The Security-Seeking State Identity 
The Second Intifada threatened Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state. To 
understand the threat to this identity posed by the Intifada, it is important to unpack the 
various concepts that comprise this identity for the state of Israel. Israel’s security-
seeking state identity is comprised of Israelis’ conceptualizations of the state as existing 
as a law-abiding member of the international system, characterized by a sameness with 
other states in the system, but within a perpetually exceptional security situation. The 
state’s security-seeker identity is highlighted by what Merom calls the myth of security 
exceptionalism. He argues that this exceptionalism is the product of the Jewish and 
Israeli people’s historical experiences of persecution, a belief in moral superiority as a 
divinely “chosen” people, and the perception that Israel’s security challenges are unique 
and, therefore, require unique solutions.147 Merom explains that the myth of security 
exceptionalism is reified by the reproduction of three exaggerated perceptions: the 
perception of a power imbalance between Israel and its neighbors, the perception of 
Arabs’ hostile intentions, and the perception of Arabs’ aggressive behavior.148 
Furthermore, as Alpher argues, Palestinian terrorism, while not an existential threat to 
Israel, is nevertheless integrated into Israelis’ sense of existential danger.149 Indeed, 
Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state is perfectly encapsulated in an often repeated 
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sentiment that “no other nation in the world has before this time faced such an intense 
wave of terror” and that, faced with such, any other state would respond with at least as 
much force as Israel has done.150 Underpinning Israel’s national identity as a security-
seeking state is the insistence in the discourse that, particularly when dealing with the 
Palestinian issue, Israel seeks security—no more, no less. While Israelis conceptualize 
the state as a law-abiding member of the international community, they understand their 
security environment as unique. 
 Recall from the previous chapter that state identities are constructed and 
maintained through routinized relationships and that disruptions to those routines 
subject a social actor’s behavior to constant scrutiny. It is this scrutiny that evinces in 
the discourse, bringing issues of identity into the fore and prompting discursive 
reassertions of the threatened identity. Discursive reassertions of the security-seeking 
state identity take three forms: selective legitimization of violence, othering, and 
identification with the international community. According to this analysis, as the 
Intifada draws scrutiny from the international community, interlocutors simultaneously 
assert Israel’s similarity to other states in the international community while 
emphasizing a perceived uniqueness of its security environment.  
Legitimization of Violence 
 The violence emanating from both sides of the Second Intifada threatened the 
security-seeking state identity in part by calling into question the legitimacy of the 
Israeli response. One particular response that receives much criticism in the discourse is 
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a recharacterization of the state’s relationship with Palestinians vis-à-vis their 
interactions with the army. Following the outbreak of violence in September of 2000, 
the Israeli Defense Forces expanded their use of deadly force by defining the events as 
“armed conflict short of war” and expanding the definition of “life threatening,” the 
acceptable condition for the use of deadly force under Israeli law.151 These changes are 
widely criticized in the discourse by international and left-leaning domestic sources. For 
example, one report from a left-leaning Israeli news source refers to the Israeli Defense 
Forces as “trigger happy” in their response to Palestinian violence.152 The report 
elaborates: 
Senior IDF officials have repeatedly rejected claims that 
soldiers fire without justification and claim that the IDF 
refrains from harming innocent persons. This report 
contradicts these claims: The IDF's open-fire policy 
throughout this intifada has resulted in extensive harm to 
Palestinian civilians who were not involved in any 
activity against Israel. These incidents are not 
"exceptional" cases, but rather they constitute a large 
portion of the casualties throughout the Occupied 
Territories.153 
 
Challenges to the legitimacy of the Israeli government’s security response to the Second 
Intifada threatens the security-seeking state identity, rendering the routines that reaffirm 
this identity vulnerable to scrutiny. Because the state’s security apparatus is perceived 
                                                 
151 “Trigger Happy: Unjustified Gunfire and the IDF’s Open-Fire Regulations during the al-Aqsa 
Intifada,” B’Tselem (Jerusalem), March, 2002. 
152 Ibid. 
153 Ibid. 
58 
 
to be motivated by ends that are unrelated to physical security, i.e. they are perceived as 
illegitimate, the security-seeking state identity is threatened. 
 Additionally, perceived failure on the part of Israeli representatives to make 
progress toward physical security ends threatens this identity. A 2001 interview with 
Former foreign minister Shlomo Ben-Ami published in a left-leaning newspaper 
exemplifies this perceived failure in the early years of the Intifada. Ben-Ami explains, 
“Yasser Arafat is hurtling us back into the 1970s, and Ariel Sharon into the 1950s. Even 
here, in Kfar Sava, you can hear shooting at night. Every night, for nearly the whole 
night, you can hear shooting from the yard.”154 This statement is particularly rich with 
imagery that is common to the early discourse of the Intifada. When Ben-Ami claims 
that Arafat is hurtling the conflict back into the 1970s, he is calling to mind the anxiety 
of the last hurrah of pan-Arabism vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, arguing that 
Arafat is attempting to revive a Cold War style tension between Israel and its neighbors 
and the heyday of the PLO. This anxiety around the strengthening of Arafat’s political 
position is prevalent in the discourse.  
Additionally, when Ben-Ami recalls the 1950s, he is arguing that then Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon is pushing the state of Israel back into a time of austerity, rapid 
confiscation of territory leading to international scrutiny, and intense security threat 
when the Law of Return (1950) granted Jewish people worldwide the right to make 
Aliyah, religious permanent immigration to Israel, increasing settlements and inflaming 
tensions with Arab neighbors. The 1950s in Israel was characterized simultaneously by 
an intense Zionist fervor as well as existential threat to the newly independent state. 
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Finally, Ben-Ami’s assertion that gunfire could be heard even from Kfar Sava is a 
powerful indictment of the government’s ability to secure the state and is repeated often 
in the discourse. Kfar Sava is a city in the Central District of Israel. Cries of audible 
gunfire in this area point to the failure of the state to secure even its most interior cities. 
Indeed, mention of clashes in central Israel are frequently juxtaposed with reminders of 
the state’s responsibility to protect its citizens, accusing the government of abdicating 
this responsibility in futile peace efforts and calling the security-seeking state identity 
into question.155 Such accusations and anxiety are present in left and right-leaning 
sources. 
 Discursive threats to Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state emanate from 
sources along the entire length of Israel’s political spectrum. Far right-leaning news 
sources question the security-seeking actions of Israel’s representatives in their attempts 
to address the violence of the Intifada, referring to former Prime Minister Ehud 
Barack’s concessions in peace negotiations as “profligate” and the rejection of these 
concessions as proof that there is no security end served by negotiating.156 In calls to 
action, some sources refer to Israel’s previous security decisions as signals of weakness 
to Arafat, including calling into question Israel’s withdrawal from the Lebanese civil 
war, arguing that Arafat “has just seen Israel, facing guerrilla war in Lebanon, abjectly 
surrender and withdraw unilaterally…now, after a year of his own guerrilla war within 
Palestine, the balance of forces with Israel has shifted dramatically in his favor,” again 
juxtaposing this accusation with a reminder of the government’s responsibility to its 
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citizens’ perceptions of physical security, exclaiming, “Israelis are afraid. They are 
afraid to send their children to the mall. They are afraid to go to the movies. They are 
afraid to drive the open road. And even worse, they are demoralized. They have lost 
hope.”157 
 By way of response to claims of illegitimacy of violence by international and 
domestic left-wing interlocutors, the Israeli government reasserts the legitimacy of its 
actions while delegitimizing Palestinian violence, constructing its use of violence as 
legitimate by comparison. Israeli government documents and political speeches show a 
discursive delegitimization of Palestinian violence, which is achieved through 
minimization and misrepresentation of Palestinians’ grievances, as well as discussion of 
Palestinian violence as distinctly unjustified. One common way in which interlocutors 
minimize Palestinians’ grievances is the misrepresentation of the beginning of the 
Second Intifada. Israeli government websites and speeches given by government 
officials minimize the salience of Ariel Sharon’s actions on the Temple Mount (known 
by Muslims as Haram al-Sharif), referring to the event as a “visit” and avoiding any 
mention of the armed guards, Sharon’s antagonistic mission, or perceived desecration of 
Muslim holy sites.158  
Another minimization of Palestinians’ grievances is evident in the imprecise 
translation of intifada. Israeli government documents and news reports translate intifada 
as uprising.159 This is a simplistic translation that ignores what the term means to those 
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engaged in intifada demonstrations. Intifada comes from an Arabic root word that 
means “to shake off”. Stripping intifada of its context and connotations obscures the 
subtext of oppression and resistance, minimizing the grievances underpinning the 
Palestinian violence of the Intifada and rendering such violence illegitimate. This 
minimization in the discourse reveals the Israeli perception of Palestinian violence as 
unjustified, illegitimate, and disproportionate and, more importantly, the perceived need 
on the part of interlocutors to reaffirm the legitimacy of the Israeli response by 
comparison in support of its identity as a security-seeking state.  
 In addition to minimization of Palestinians’ grievances, the discourse reveals 
wholesale delegitimization of all Palestinian violence as unjust and unjustified. Israeli 
government documents refer to Palestinian acts of violence as “mass murder attacks”, 
“murderous attacks”, “hostile terrorist activity”, and “indiscriminate terrorism”.160 This 
language is also evident in left and right-leaning Israeli news articles and NGO briefs 
published after the release of these government reports.161 Only far-left domestic 
sources eschew this language. Couching the Intifada in terms of unjustified and 
indiscriminate violence absent provocation shows a discursive effort to reassert the 
security-seeking state identity in the face of international and far-left attacks on this 
identity as outlined above. As the international community and far-left news sources 
question the legitimacy of the Israeli response, arguing essentially that Israel’s 
relationship to Palestinians supports an identity of occupier, rather than of a law-abiding 
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security-seeking state, domestic right and center-left sources attempt to reaffirm the 
security-seeker identity by delegitimizing Palestinian violence in comparison.  
 While the Israeli political discourse on the Intifada constructs Palestinian acts of 
violence as illegitimate, it legitimizes Israeli acts of violence. The same government 
reports that label Palestinian violence as “indiscriminate terrorism” differentiate Israeli 
violence by characterizing it as “preventive, precisely targeted operations” against 
“legitimate military targets,” arguing that “all civilized nations” would behave in the 
same way.162 Israeli government reports also emphasize Israeli statehood and 
sovereignty to bolster claims of legitimate use of force; each government document 
analyzed refers repeatedly to statehood and sovereignty when discussing Israel’s 
response to violence.163  
Additionally, Israeli government officials use misdirection to uphold the 
legitimacy of the state’s actions in the eyes of interlocutors in the international 
community, suggesting a need on the part of the government to reassert an identity 
under threat. For example, in a 2001 interview with C-SPAN contributor Peter Slen, 
former Israeli Ambassador to the United Nations and then senior advisor to Prime 
Minister Ariel Sharon, Dore Gold, dodges questions about Arab civilian deaths at the 
hands of the Israeli Defense Forces. When asked about a news story in which an Arab 
child was shot by IDF soldiers in Gaza, Gold responds by arguing that Palestinians 
should not bring children to areas of confrontation, ignoring the fact that such 
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confrontation often takes place in Palestinian residential districts.164 In the same 
interview, when asked about the death of a Palestinian Authority spokeswoman, Gold 
redirects to an unrelated IDF mission in which a terror group was apprehended before 
committing a planned attack, transforming the attention on the IDF from negative to 
positive.165 Such discursive engagements with the international community in particular 
show a perceived threat to the security-seeking state identity and an attempt to reassert 
it. Relationships are co-constitutive of identities. Therefore, Israel’s preferred role 
identity within the international system can only be supported inasmuch as Israel’s 
identity as a law-abiding security-seeking state is recognized by its significant others.   
Like Any Other State 
 One half of the security exceptionalism concept underpinning Israel’s identity as 
a security-seeking state is its perceived unique security environment, as discussed 
above. The other half of this concept is in Israel’s perceived sameness: its identification 
with other law-abiding states in the international system. Scrutiny of Israel’s response to 
violence during the Intifada called this sameness, and with it Israel’s identity as a 
security-seeking state, into question. In an op-ed published by a right-leaning Israeli 
news source, for example, the author laments, “Israel is not just suffering, it is isolated. 
The vilification of Israel, temporarily moderated during the Oslo interlude, has resumed 
full force at the United Nations, the Arab League and in Europe.”166 The international 
community’s relationship with Israel during the Intifada years failed to affirm Israel’s 
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identity as a security-seeking state, prompting much anxiety over this role identity in the 
discourse.  
The discourse on the political far-left reveals an internalized identity insecurity, 
joining the international community’s assessment that Israel violated international 
law.167 Additionally, publications by the Israeli government and right-leaning sources 
include reinterpretations of international law meant to show Israel’s compliance and 
reaffirm its identity vis-à-vis the international community.168 One government 
document, for example, asserts, “The Government of Israel has an obligation to defend 
its citizens against terrorism. This right of self-defense is anchored in international law. 
The antiterrorist fence is an act of self-defense that saves lives.”169 Arguments within 
the discourse around Israel’s compliance with international law point to a perceived 
threat against Israel’s role identity within the international community, a vital 
component of the security-seeking state identity.  
 The anxiety around Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state goes beyond 
mere discursive hand-wringing over international law, appearing in assertions that the 
state of Israel is an honest international insider, no different from any other state, as 
well as conceptualizations of the Palestinian leadership as a dishonest other, a rogue 
outsider. Much of the discourse around Israel’s identification with the international 
community during the Intifada years is characterized by the insistence that Israel is 
fundamentally no different from other law-abiding states in the international system and 
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that other states simply do not understand Israel’s unique security environment. 
Decrying the international community’s response to Israel’s anti-terror measures, one 
right-leaning publication argues, “The policy of targeting terrorist ringleaders has been 
called "assassination" and widely denounced. These denunciations are the epitome of 
hypocrisy. What country would not go after those who were sending bombs into the 
middle of its cities?”170 Further, “no country can tolerate the bloodshed daily inflicted 
on Israel by Arafat's war. At some point either this government will act, or it will fall 
and a new government will do what needs to be done.”171 
Similar language depicting Israel as no different from other states is also present 
in left-leaning sources. Explaining the failure of the 2000 Camp David Summit, one 
Israeli diplomat defines the failure in terms of Israel’s good-faith attempts, “In the end, 
even the most moderate negotiator reaches a point where he understands that there is no 
end to it.”172 Israeli government documents also repeatedly assert Israel’s in-group 
status, claiming that, faced with similar violence, any other state would respond as 
Israel has done, if not more forcefully.173  
 Israelis’ conceptualization of their national identity as just like any other 
security-seeking state and its anxiety over this threatened identity is also evidenced in 
feelings of betrayal or mistreatment by their ingroup: the international community. 
Railing against the international community’s admonishments, some sources point to 
other states’ actions as proof of a hypocritical bias against Israel:  
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In 1998, President Clinton ordered cruise missile attacks 
on Usama bin Laden's bases in Afghanistan. The obvious 
objective was to kill him. Or failing that, to kill enough of 
his followers to deter or slow down their operations. And 
when, in 1986, the United States found Libya responsible 
for a terrorist bombing that killed two American soldiers 
in a Berlin discotheque, it did not send Qaddafi a 
subpoena. It bombed his tent.174 
 
 
Criticism from the international community of Israel’s early response to the violence of 
the Intifada prompted Israeli interlocutors to reassert the legitimacy of the state’s 
security-seeking actions. The form of these discursive reassertions of identity reveal an 
identification with other states in the international community and anxiety when this 
identification is not recognized in the state’s relationships within its ingroup. A 
particularly interesting aspect of this ingroup identification is Israel’s perception of 
belonging to a Western ingroup specifically. In justifying the state’s turn from 
diplomacy to unilateral military action during the Intifada, for example, interlocutors 
commonly place Israel within the context of Western civilization. In an op-ed published 
by a right-leaning news organization, for example, one author proclaims Israel’s need 
for a military solution in terms of other great military solutions of Western history, 
arguing that the military victory needed to secure the Israeli state is no different from 
the conquests of Alexander the Great that led to the establishment of the Hellenistic 
world, the victory of Napoleon at Waterloo, or Europe’s victory over the Third Reich.175  
 In addition to asserting its identity as a security-seeking state through its status 
as a member of an ingroup characterized by such, the state and other domestic sources 
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cast the Palestinian Authority, by contrast, as a dishonest other, an outsider. This is not 
to say that interlocutors necessarily cynically employ discourses of national identity to 
otherize an enemy. Rather, the way in which Israel conceptualizes the PA’s otherness 
provides insight into its own identity and the threats perceived. One op-ed, for example, 
highlights the perceived bad-faith negotiating of the Palestinian Authority, exclaiming 
that Israel took many risks to negotiate in good faith, “giving Arafat his armed mini-
state and adding steadily to its territory under relentless pressure from Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright” only to have Arafat return the favor with attacks on “innocents 
outside a Tel Aviv discotheque, in a Jerusalem pizzeria, in a Haifa cafeteria.”176 Such 
perceived bad-faith negotiating is seen by Israelis as “driving wedges between Israel 
and its allies,” inviting unfair criticism from the international community and 
intensifying anxiety around the ingroup status that underpins Israel’s identity as a 
security-seeking state.177  
The view of Arafat himself and the PA more broadly as bad-faith negotiators is 
present in right-leaning and government sources as well as left-leaning sources. A 
former Labor Party official in an interview for a left-leaning publication, for example, 
echoes these feelings of betrayal and disappointment, decrying the PA’s rigidity in the 
failed 2000 Camp David Summit: 
I asked them which of the sides here wanted to establish a 
state - us or them. I felt terribly frustrated that we were 
making such a creative, flexible move and reaching one of 
the finest moments of the negotiations, and they couldn't 
free themselves from their gibes, from the need for 
vindication, from their victimization.178 
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Much of the discourse of otherization of the PA vis-à-vis the international community 
juxtaposes the perceived untrustworthy character of Palestinian officials with the 
perceived surprising level of support they receive from Israel’s ingroup. In a widely-
circulated op-ed originally published in the Jerusalem Post and shared online through 
blogs and newsletters in 2003, for example, journalist Bret Stephens proclaims Saeb 
Erekat, former negotiator for the Palestinian Authority, a liar and criticizes Western 
publications in general and the New York Times specifically for publishing Erekat’s 
pieces uncritically.179 He argues that the West betrays Israel by taking part in the PA’s 
“propaganda war” and accuses Erekat of intellectual dishonesty, stating, “Let's dispatch 
with the notion that the existence of settlements simply propels Palestinians to violence, 
as if they were incapable of mature moral reflection, or that anything less than complete 
acquiescence to Palestinian demands can make for a peaceful settlement or a two-state 
solution.”180  
 The state of Israel, as part of its identity as a security-seeking state, considers 
itself a law-abiding member of the international community while viewing the PA as an 
untrustworthy violator of international law. The otherizing discourse around the PA 
exemplifies Israel’s construction of this identity in terms of ingroup and outgroup 
identification. This is evinced not only in discursive references to the PA, but also in 
Israelis’ feelings of betrayal by the international community more broadly and 
especially the Western ingroup more specifically. The selective legitimation of 
violence, as shown by Israeli discourse around themes of statehood and sovereignty, 
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reveals not only the ingroup component of Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state 
but also the anxiety produced by threats to this identity. Multiple reassertions of 
sovereignty, statehood, and sameness vis-à-vis the international community reveal the 
threat to the security-seeking state identity caused by international and domestic 
scrutiny of Israel’s response to violence during the Second Intifada. The need to 
reaffirm the security-seeking state identity to its citizens as well as the international 
community created a tension between public opinion and international law.  
Public opinion surveys confirm the public demand for security by increasingly 
military means as found in the discourse, but this is not a simple result of Intifada 
violence. In 2002, 41 percent of Jewish Israelis surveyed said that they were prepared to 
make fewer concessions to the Palestinians than they were before the Intifada began, 
compared to 10% who classified their attitudes as having become more conciliatory. 
This is a significant change compared to the First Intifada. Over the years of the first 
intifada, from 1987 to 1993, 20% reported becoming more militant, and 20% more 
conciliatory, while the remainder claimed no change.181 An aggressive military solution, 
while demanded by the far-right, would have opened Israel to further international 
condemnation, threatening its role identity vis-à-vis the international community. 
Conversely, as discussed above, additional concessions on the part of Israel toward 
negotiations with the PA would further damage Israelis’ trust in their state as a security-
seeker. The decision to erect a barrier as part of a unilateral disengagement plan 
provided the least undesirable physical security option vis-à-vis this identity.  
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Opposition to the barrier on the grounds of the security-seeking state identity is 
absent from the discourse leading up to the decision with the notable exception of very 
far-left publications like B’Tselem, but the themes evident in these publications are not 
evident elsewhere and have little impact on the wider discourse. Opposition to the 
barrier on the grounds of the security-seeking state identity relies solely on the ingroup 
aspect of this identity, specifically speculation about potential human rights violations 
that may occur as a result of the barrier, relying on previous routines established 
between Israel and the Palestinians as evidence.182 The Israeli government, however, 
has a long history of interpreting international law in ways that safeguard this identity, 
insulating the particular routines referenced in these criticisms from scrutiny by 
discursively dismissing it.183 Furthermore, because the only opposition to the barrier’s 
construction within the themes of this security-seeking state identity rely upon a 
relationship with the Palestinians that is already routinized and well-within the wider 
Israeli conception of this national identity, such opposition does not successfully 
problematize the barrier in terms of the security-seeking state identity. Successful 
problematization is more evident within the context of the Jewish national identity, but 
this is debated not in terms of the decision to construct the barrier, but its route.  
The Jewish National Identity 
The Intifada also threatened the Jewish national identity of the state of Israel. According 
to every interview I conducted with Israeli Knesset members, aids, journalists, and one 
academic, the most salient identity to the state of Israel, particularly when dealing with 
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the Palestinian issue, is the Jewish national identity.184 It is necessary here to explicate 
the finer details of this identity to understand how the Second Intifada threatened it and 
how the separation barrier was discursively constructed as a means to secure it. In an 
interview with the author in July 2017, a political scientist who requested anonymity 
explains that the Jewish national identity is inextricable from the Jewish historical 
experience of persecution and diaspora.185 For the Jewish people, the political memory 
of the Holocaust, historical denial of a Jewish homeland, persecution of diaspora 
communities, and perceived anti-Semitism from the international community produce 
perceptions of physical insecurity that a Jewish state, existing specifically on the 
religiously and historically significant Jewish homeland, alleviates.186 Indeed, these 
themes of historical trauma, anti-Semitism, and connection to the land are frequently 
juxtaposed with the Jewish national identity in the discourse, particularly when that 
identity is perceived to be under threat. This section discusses the perceived threat 
posed to the Jewish national identity by the Second Intifada and the discursive 
construction of the barrier as a potential solution or further threat, depending on the 
interlocutor. Themes of otherizing and delegitimization are also present. 
The Arab Other  
One way in which the Jewish national identity manifests in the political 
discourse around the Intifada is in the otherization of Arabs. Israeli government 
documents, NGO briefs, and news reports discursively separate Arabs in general from 
the larger Israeli populous, effectively othering the Arab minority while asserting 
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Jewish national identity. In a 2004 report on the Intifada, the Israel Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs refers separately to Jewish and Arab Israelis, referring to Israeli Jews as citizens 
and Israeli Arabs as residents.187 This rhetoric normalizes the othering of not only 
Palestinian Arabs, but also those Arabs who hold Israeli citizenship. Furthermore, the 
same report frequently refers to terror attacks in terms of Jewish holidays.188 
Highlighting terror attacks as occurring the week of Rosh Hashanah or the night before 
Passover, for example, juxtaposes Arab violence with Jewish identity, intimating an 
attack on Jewishness specifically, rather than on all Israeli citizens, and othering even 
Israeli Arab citizens by denying their victimhood. This othering is evident in 
government documents and right-leaning publications as well as left-leaning sources.189  
This otherizing of Arab-Israeli citizens in Ministry publications is specific to the 
years of the Second Intifada. In documents published in the years immediately prior to 
the outset of the Second Intifada, Arab-Israelis are referred to as citizens, rather than 
residents.190 Reference to Arab-Israelis as citizens is notably absent from Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs publications from the years 2000 through 2005, with very few 
references to Arab-Israelis as anything other than “residents” or “inhabitants” until 
2007.191 In a 2016 op-ed in The Times of Israel calling for completion of the barrier, one 
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interlocutor claims that “benign security conditions” significantly reduced public 
pressure to complete the “gaping holes” in the barrier, which has remained incomplete 
since constructed halted in 2007.192 Additionally, Alpher argues that Israel has 
historically sought to achieve a public perception of security.193 This suggests that the 
same perceived threat reduction that led to the abandonment of the barrier’s 
construction in 2007 may also have led to the abandonment of otherization of Arabs 
around the same time, pointing to a perceived reduction in the threat to the Jewish 
national identity. 
Another example of the perceived threat to the Jewish identity during the 
Second Intifada is the practice of publishing data on Jewish victims of violence since 
the Intifada began in September 2000. In the intense anxiety around the Jewish identity 
during the Intifada, the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel 
published a list in 2003 of all the Jewish victims of anti-Semitic violence worldwide 
from 1968 to the date of publication.194 This list made national news and spoke to the 
perceived insecurity of the Jewish identity itself, not only the perceived threat to the 
Jewish state. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs published a similar list in 2001 for 
domestic victims of Palestinian terrorism and keeps this list updated, with the last entry 
in March of 2018.195 Here, as in other Israeli government publications mentioned above, 
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Arab-Israeli citizens who were victims of violence are referred to as “residents”.196 This 
suggests that, even after the crisis period of intense threat to the Jewish national identity 
has ended, Palestinian violence in particular remains a perceived threat to this identity.  
While the discourse surrounding the Jewish national identity during the Intifada 
otherizes Arab-Israelis by denying their citizenship and, with it, their victimhood in the 
Intifada violence, the discourse further otherizes Arab-Israelis by constructing them as 
indistinct from the Palestinian enemy. News sources and government reports on 
violence committed by Palestinians either use the terms “Arab” and “Palestinian” 
interchangeably or eschew the word “Palestinian” altogether, referring to every 
perpetrator of a terror attack as an “Arab.” As one article reports, “The police caught a 
busload of 62 Palestinian infiltrators along the Afula-Jenin highway this afternoon. The 
Arabs had painted the vehicle to make it look like an Egged bus, and one of the 
passengers even wore a yarmulke for the occasion.”197 Highlighting their identities as 
Arabs as well as Palestinians obscures any distinction between the two, revealing the 
conceptualization of the Palestinians and Arab-Israelis as more alike than Arab-Israelis 
and Jewish-Israelis. Later in the same article, the reporter notes, “Later today, Arabs 
shot at a car north of Ganim in the northern Shomron; no one was hurt, but bullets hit 
the car...”198  
Other similar reports of violence refer only to “Arab assailants” in opposition to 
“Israeli” victims, further evincing the conceptualization of Arab as indistinct from the 
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Palestinian political enemy and, more importantly, as distinctly not Israeli.199 This 
obscures the distinction between Arab-Israelis and Palestinians, reasserting the Jewish 
national identity by constructing every Arab as a potentially threatening, non-Israeli 
other. This construction of Arabs as a threatening other is supported in public opinion 
surveys, as well. According to a 2002 poll of Jewish Israelis, 42 percent thought that 
“Arabs wanted to kill much of the Jewish population of Israel” and an additional 26 
percent reported thinking Arabs wanted to conquer the state of Israel, meaning that 68 
percent of the Jewish-Israelis surveyed perceived Arabs as a threat.200  
International Threat to Identity 
Perceived threat to the Jewish identity of the Israeli state during the Intifada is 
also evident in references to Israel’s relationship to the Palestinian Authority, its other 
Arab neighbors, and its ingroup: the international community. In the public discourse, 
perceptions of this threat are expressed in themes of trust, betrayal, and anti-Semitism. 
One op-ed published by Israel’s most popular right-leaning news source exemplifies 
this sentiment, lamenting, “not only do even pro-Western Arab states, like Saudi Arabia 
and Egypt, talk of making war on Israel again, but even the basest of anti-Semitic 
calumnies, the ‘Zionism is racism’ canard, has been resurrected at a U.N. conference on 
racism, no less. The mask of ‘recognition’ is off.”201 The recognition referenced here is 
the recognition of Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state. Israel has sought such 
recognition from its ingroup as well as from the Palestinian Authority in negotiations 
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from Oslo to Taba, and much insecurity around this recognition is evinced in the 
discourse during the Intifada years.202 This statement exemplifies Israelis’ feelings of 
betrayal by the international community and perceived dishonesty on the part of Arab 
states with regard to their recognition of Israel.  
Many interlocutors also perceive Arafat himself as uncompromising and his 
motives as anti-Semitic, making connections to the collective political memory of the 
Holocaust. For example: 
So long as one could imagine him as a peace partner, 
simply wanting a better deal but ready in the end to accept 
a Jewish state living side-by-side with Palestine, one 
could imagine needing him. Yet Arafat has not wavered 
from the unbroken Palestinian tradition of rejecting 
compromise. In 1947, when the Palestinians were offered 
a state side-by-side with a Jewish state, they rejected it in 
favor of a war of extermination, a war that failed. In 1978, 
they were offered negotiations and autonomy after the 
Camp David peace treaty between Israel and Egypt. The 
PLO rejected the offer root and branch.203 
 
Reference to a war of extermination calls to mind the motives of the Nazis during the 
Holocaust, connecting the Palestinian leadership’s actions to a historical trauma for 
Jewish people and drawing into focus the perceived threat, not simply to Israel as a 
state, but to its Jewish people and Jewish identity. Discursive constructions of this 
much-desired recognition almost always include references to the Jewish identity.  
There Is No Palestine, Only Israel 
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 As outlined above, an important component of the Jewish national identity, and 
one that was clearly threatened by the events of the Second Intifada, is the Jewish 
connection to Eretz Yisrael, the Land of Israel. Eretz Yisrael is a concept of the ancient 
Jewish homeland which includes some areas already under unilateral control of the state 
of Israel, as well as Jerusalem, Judea and Sumeria (the Biblical and officially 
recognized names for the two regions comprising the West Bank), and Gaza. In this 
way, the Jewish national identity includes a claim to specific physical territory that 
includes land currently occupied by Palestinians. The state’s claim to these lands, and 
therefore its Jewish identity, was threatened during the 2000 Camp David negotiations 
and the subsequent Intifada, and much anxiety over this identity threat is evident in the 
discourse. Interlocutors are compelled to insist on Judea and Sumeria as parts of “the 
rest of Israel,” balking at even the term West Bank.204  
Additionally, ancestral claims to Eretz Yisrael are juxtaposed with 
delegitimization of Palestinian claims. References to a controversial 1984 book by Joan 
Peters, in which she argues against Palestinian claims of indigeneity, feature widely in 
arguments against Palestinians’ rights to the land. These arguments are frequently 
accompanied by the claim that there has never been a Palestinian land, nor Palestinians 
from which to confiscate land, because there has never been a Palestine.205 The need to 
discursively delegitimize Palestinian claims to territory on ethno-religious grounds 
while asserting Jewish claims on the same grounds intimates the perception that 
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challenges to Israel’s right to specific lands are perceived as challenges to the Jewish 
national identity.  
The Barrier Debate 
 The decision to build the West Bank barrier is largely constructed in terms of the 
Jewish national identity, and debate as to its acceptability as a policy option mostly 
revolves around the extent to which the barrier would uphold or threaten this identity. 
As journalist Tal Schneider recalls, support for and opposition to the barrier policy 
came from the political left as well as the right, but the Jewish national identity 
remained central to the issue.206 The threat to the Jewish national identity often takes the 
form of anxiety around a lack of clearly defined borders.207 The Jewish state’s lack of 
clearly defined borders creates an insecurity around Jewish claims to territory, which 
was intensified after the failure of Camp David and the onset of the Second Intifada. 
Leaving the Jewish state’s borders, and with it its claims to the land, uncertain before a 
perceived anti-Semitic enemy became intolerable. In support for the barrier policy, 
many interlocutors reference perceived reluctance on the part of Palestinian leadership 
to recognize a Jewish state. This perceived reluctance to affirm the state’s identity 
creates uncertainty, particularly as this reluctance is coupled with Palestinians’ own 
claims to land: 
Because the fate and political direction of the Palestinians will 
remain uncertain, Israel must then take one supreme protective 
measure: enforce a separation between Palestinian and Israeli 
populations, until the Palestinians decide they actually want to 
                                                 
206 Tal Schneider (journalist) in discussion with the author, June 2017. 
207 Newman, “The Lines that Continue to Separate Us: Borders in Our ‘Borderless’ World,” Progress in 
Human Geography 30, no. 2 (2006): 147. 
79 
 
live in openness and peace with the Jewish state. That means 
erecting a fence separating Israel and Palestinian territory.208 
For some, therefore, disengagement is constructed as an interim solution to this 
uncertainty. This conflicts directly with Lupovici’s argument that the West Bank barrier 
policy was meant to create uncertainty as an avoidance measure. 
For others, the barrier policy is constructed as merely a first step in securing the 
Jewish national identity, pointing to a perennial source of anxiety over demographics 
within Israel. General Security Services (Shin Bet) director Avi Dichter, for example, in 
the same press briefing in which he announces Shin Bet’s official support for the barrier 
policy, cautions that it does not solve the “problem” of potential threats posed by Arab-
Israelis, who might be sympathetic to Palestinian terrorists.209 In response to this 
announcement, MK Michael Kleiner (Likud), agrees, elaborating that “solutions such as 
transfer, a Palestinian state, or a fence only address the problem of the Arabs of Judea, 
Samaria and the Gaza Strip, but do not solve the growing hostility among the Arab 
citizens of Israel.”210 Public opinion data supports the prevalence of this sentiment. 46 
percent of Jewish-Israelis surveyed in 2002 supported transfer of Palestinians who lived 
in the territories, and 31% supported the transfer of Israeli Arabs.211 Furthermore, 60 
percent agreed to “government encouraging voluntary emigration of Israeli Arabs”, and 
53 percent approved of “a more general idea of ‘encouraging Arabs to leave the 
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country’ without stipulating whether this was forced or voluntary, or whether it 
involved Israeli Arabs or Arabs in the territories.”212 
 In 2002, the National Union-Yisrael Beiteinu party submitted a statement to 
Prime Minister Ariel Sharon supporting the barrier policy but arguing against ceding 
territory. In a press release, MK Tzivi Hendel argues, “at least let’s try to prevent the 
fence from being placed on the Green Line, thus effectively giving over all of Yesha to 
the PA. It would be better to put the fence around Area A- where are most of the Arabs, 
most of the terrorists…”213 The issue of ceding territory, while considered room for 
debate by the barrier’s supporters, is cause for alarm for the policy’s detractors. 
Following this discursive pattern, opposition to the barrier also calls upon the 
Jewish national identity. Then Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, a Labor Party leader and 
vocal supporter of the Oslo Accords, in a meeting with barrier supporters within his 
party, argues specifically against a barrier on the Green Line, stating that “such a border 
would, among other things, essentially forfeit the blood of the Jewish residents of Yesha 
who remain on the other side.”214 Yesha is a Hebrew acronym for Judea, Samaria, and 
Gaza. Here, Peres is arguing that a barrier route along the Green Line amounts to 
abandoning Jewish settlers in the Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Use 
of the acronym Yesha is common in the discourse alongside references to Jewish 
ancestral claims to Eretz Yisrael. Using Yesha as a collective term for non-contiguous 
parcels of territory evinces the conceptualization of the ancestral homeland of the 
Jewish people as comprising the whole of Israeli as well as Palestinian territories and as 
indivisible.  
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For many interlocutors within the discourse, abandoning Jewish settlers, Jewish 
holy sites, or any piece of Eretz Yisrael is anathema to the Jewish identity of the state. 
Public opinion data reflects this anxiety. General support for the separation plan, which 
included the proposed barrier, was high in 2002, but diminished when the survey 
delineated the impacts on Jewish settlements and territory. 81 percent of respondents 
were in favor of unilateral separation, but less than half (48 percent) supported a 
separation plan that included removal of settlements, and only 38 percent supported 
ceding 80 percent of the West Bank and retaining 20 percent for future negotiations.215 
Thus, much of the discourse around the barrier policy hinged on how successful the 
barrier would be at “defining Israel's borders and preserving its Jewish nature.”216 
 Opposition to the barrier policy in the discourse gives way to support as the 
government is perceived to be taking measures to safeguard the Jewish national 
identity. One organization dedicated to Rachel’s Tomb, for example, objected to the 
barrier in an update dated July 2002, but this objection turned to support in an update on 
September 12, 2002, shortly after the Security Cabinet announced a revised route for 
the barrier that would include religiously significant Jewish sites in Palestinian territory 
around Jerusalem.217 Similarly, in an op-ed published by Israel’s most popular right-
leaning news source, a former critic of the proposed barrier reverses his position after 
Sharon’s government announced its plan to extend the barrier into the West Bank to 
incorporate Jewish settlements, exclaiming, “we have no way of promising something 
in exchange to the Arabs of Eretz Israel. A voluntary agreement is ruled out, and 
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therefore settlement can proceed apace only under the protection of a force which is not 
dependent upon the local population, an iron wall which the local population will be 
unable to breach.”218  
Initially, many Likud party members balked at Labor party proposals for the 
barrier route, arguing that they ceded too much territory, abandoned too many Jewish 
settlements, and relinquished too many holy sites. One Likud party member’s argument 
in favor of the barrier, however, appears to have had a great impact on the political 
right. Arguing in favor of the policy from a different perspective, MK Michael Eitan 
explains the need for a barrier, specifically “one that would prevent illegal Arab 
immigration into Israel-proper. Only holders of Israeli passports would be allowed to 
pass through. Otherwise we have a situation where Arabs from the Palestinian 
Authority pass through and end up staying in Jaffa, Lod, Taibe, and implementing the 
Right of Return right under our noses. What, are we crazy?”219 This argument is 
repeated in the discourse and seems to have, along with revised routes that absorb more 
territory, Jewish settlements, and holy sites, positively influenced support for the barrier 
among Likud’s more far-right factions.  
These factions had initially, as mentioned above, objected to the barrier on the 
grounds of its perceived failure to secure the Jewish national identity. However, in 
2003, after several rounds of route revisions that moved the barrier farther east of the 
Green Line, the Likud party voted in favor of the barrier. Ironically, MK Michael Eitan 
withdrew his support for the barrier on the grounds of monetary cost and tentatively 
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revived talks with the Palestinian leadership.220 Fringe opposition to the barrier, 
therefore, was alleviated by assurances that the Jewish national identity would be 
secured. The barrier policy had general support from the Israeli population during the 
Second Intifada, including the support of Likud and Labor party leadership. The 
discourse on the separation policy, as discussed in this section, shows that even those 
who did not consider the barrier a security solution supported it on the grounds of a 
perceived function of securing the Jewish identity of the state. Furthermore, those who 
doubted this function reversed their positions when the barrier route was revised to 
better fit their conceptualization of the Jewish national identity. The following section 
details the discourse around Israel’s democratic identity during the Intifada and shows 
that the barrier policy was not a threat to this identity.  
Defending the Ethnic Democracy 
Lupovici argues that the Second Intifada threatened the identities of the state of Israel in 
such a way as to render the solutions to each incompatible with other identities.221 As 
outlined in the previous chapter, he argues that the state could not simultaneously secure 
the Jewish identity, the democratic identity, and the security-provider identity. I 
reconceptualized the security-seeker identity above in accordance with the national 
identity discourse. Here, I also problematize Lupovici’s assumptions regarding Israel’s 
democratic identity; I argue that, rather than a liberal democracy, the political elite 
understand the Israeli democracy an ethnic democracy in the mode of defending 
democracy, and show that the barrier policy was not a measure taken to avoid 
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dissonance but rather a policy meant to address directly the threats to the state’s 
identities.  
Recall from the previous chapter that Lupovici defines ontological dissonance as 
a situation in which two or more identities of a social actor are threatened and the means 
to secure one identity conflicts with another of the actor’s identities. According to this 
understanding of Israel’s identities, the barrier policy was a means of avoidance, a 
measure to create ambiguity. Lupovici supports this argument by citing op-eds calling 
for a separation from Palestinians and expressing a desire for “quiet.”222 Avoidance of 
Palestinians, however, is not avoidance of an ontological dissonance. Further, as argued 
above, the barrier was discursively constructed as a means to reduce ambiguity and to 
address the uncertainty of the territorial boundaries of the Jewish state, not create 
ambiguity as a means of avoidance.  
The Ethnic Democracy and Defending Mode 
Central to his argument of ontological security dissonance in the case of Israel 
during the Second Intifada is the conceptualization of Israel as a liberal democracy. 
Some scholars have argued, however, that Israel cannot be defined as such and, 
therefore, take a more communal, rather than individualistic, understanding of Israel’s 
democracy.223 Smooha argues, for example,  that Israel is a type of democracy that is 
communal and hierarchical in nature, referring to Israel as an ethnic democracy, which 
he defines as “a system that combines the extension of civil and political rights to 
individuals and some collective rights to minorities, with institutionalization of majority 
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control over the state.”224 According to this understanding, ethnic nationalism is not 
only an accepted part of this type of democracy, but a driving force. He explains: 
The state practices a policy of creating a homogenous 
nation-state, a state of and for a particular ethnic nation, 
and acts to promote the language, culture, numerical 
majority, economic well-being, and political interests of 
this group. Although enjoying citizenship and voting 
rights, the minorities are treated as second-class citizens, 
feared as a threat, excluded from the national power 
structure, and placed under some control. At the same 
time, the minorities are allowed to conduct a democratic 
and peaceful struggle that yields incremental 
improvement in their status.225 
 
In this way, according to Smooha, the state’s conceptualization of democracy is one that 
protects the interests of the majority community, rather than the individual. This 
understanding is congruent with the Jewish national identity as described in the first 
section of this chapter. Because the Israeli conceptualization of its democracy is one 
that requires the state to promote the political interests of the Jewish nation, measures 
that secure the Jewish national identity would be congruous with this democratic 
national identity. But what about potential conflict between the measures needed to 
uphold Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state and the democratic identity? 
 Pedahzur explains the “defending democracy” as “a democracy which excludes 
from the democratic game groups whose aims or actions may endanger the state, its 
political regime or its basic national consensus.”226 Quoting Israeli Supreme Court 
Justice Yoel Zussman, who characterizes Israel as a “defending democracy,” Pedahzur 
argues that the Israeli conceptualization of democracy includes a moral obligation to 
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defend itself as a democratic state by any means necessary, widening the field of 
acceptable policy options available to defend the state where it perceives a threat, up to 
and including barring certain groups from participation in democratic processes.227 This 
is also in line with Sandholtz’s understanding of justificatory behavior on the part of 
states seeking to establish their behavior as adhering to, rather than violating, sets of 
norms.228 
It is important to note, however, that the definition Pedahzur provides may leave 
the reader with the impression that the defending democracy is a type of democracy. 
This is not the case. As Pedahzur goes on to explain, the defending democracy is best 
understood not as a form of government but, rather, as “the course chosen by a 
democracy in its efforts to protect itself…[its] modes of response [to threats].”229 This 
leaves room for the possibility that the nature of a particular democracy may dictate its 
mode of response. Such courses or modes of action here suggest an understanding of 
defending democracy as a set of routines characterized by rigid attachment modes as 
explained in the previous chapter. This understanding is very much in line with Israel’s 
identity as a security-seeking state, as it widens the state’s field of options to defend 
itself without threatening its democratic identity. Taken together with the 
conceptualization of Israel’s democracy as an ethnic democracy, then, it is likely that 
the measures to secure the Jewish identity of the state could also support, rather than 
threaten, its democratic and security-seeking identities.  
Political Exclusion as Defending Democracy 
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One way this ethnic democratic identity and its rigid defending democracy 
attachment mode manifest in the discourse is in Israelis’ anxiety over the loyalty of 
Arab members of the Knesset during the Second Intifada and suggestions that, to 
protect the democracy, such members should be excluded. One editorial in Israel’s most 
popular newspaper (by subscription) criticized Arab MKs for participating in Arab 
celebrations of the IDF’s withdrawal from some occupied territories in the West Bank, 
claiming that the MKs are “stretching the cords of democracy so much that they are in 
danger of rupturing” and calling for disqualification of their political parties.230 Support 
for the political exclusion of Arabs during the Intifada is evident in public opinion data, 
as well. A 2002 survey of Israelis’ opinions on national security finds that 72 percent 
surveyed opposed the inclusion of Arab political parties in the governing coalition, and 
80 percent supported excluding Arab-Israelis from participation in decisions on the 
state’s boundaries.231  
Calls for political exclusion and, indeed, actual policies of political exclusion do 
not amount to a disruption of routines during the Intifada or a threat to the democratic 
identity. In fact, they are adherence to Israeli law, as the Central Elections Committee’s 
responsibilities include banning political parties it deems threatening to the 
democracy.232 In 1988, this meant banning the Progressive List for Peace after it 
supported a return to the pre-1967 boundaries, as well as the Kach Party, an ultra-
orthodox Jewish-nationalist party, for calling for the deportation of all non-Jews from 
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Israel.233 It should be noted, however, that bans on left-wing parties sympathetic to the 
Arab cause are more frequent, with the Kach Party ban being the only ban on a Jewish 
political party in the state’s history.234 Several center-left and far-left secular parties, as 
well as Arab parties, have been banned as threats to the state, one notably for supporting 
the establishment of an Israeli state that is not Jewish in nature.235 These actions are 
very much in line with Pedahzur’s understanding of the defending democracy as 
perceiving a responsibility to defend itself against challenges to its “basic national 
consensus.”236 These actions and the discourse around political exclusion also support 
Smooha’s understanding of Israel as an ethnic democracy, one that institutionalizes the 
interests of the Jewish population.237 
This political exclusion as a means to secure a democratic identity is also part of 
Israel’s relationship to its Palestinian neighbors. In a speech delivered at the Institute for 
Contemporary Affairs, shortly after the 2005 election of Mahmoud Abbas as President 
of the Palestinian National Authority, Minister of Foreign Affairs Silvan Shalom urges 
the Palestinian leadership to exclude Hamas and other anti-Israel organizations from the 
political process in order to “normalize relations with Israel.”238 In this speech, he 
constructs democracy and economic development as necessary conditions for the 
normalization of relations between Israel and the Palestinian leadership, also intimating 
that any Palestinian democratic system that included those with fervently anti-Israel 
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sentiments would not be recognized as a democracy by the state of Israel.239 After the 
Hamas victory in elections in 2006, Israel imposed economic sanctions against the 
Palestinian Authority. This suggests that Israel’s conceptualization of its moral 
obligation to defend its ethnic democracy extends beyond the limits of its own political 
processes.  
The Barrier: An Avoidance? 
 Lupovici argues, as outlined above, that the barrier was a measure of avoidance, 
a way to create ambiguity to insulate Israel from an ontological dissonance. To support 
this view of the democratic identity as threatened by means to secure Israel’s other 
identities, Lupovici quotes a statement from Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in an address 
to the Knesset in favor of the separation plan.240 “We have no desire,” he explains, “to 
permanently rule over millions of Palestinians, who double their numbers every 
generation. Israel, which wishes to be an exemplary democracy, will not be able to bear 
such a reality over time.”241 Lupovici argues that this statement indicates a dissonance 
between Israel’s identity as a democracy and its routines as an occupier, interpreting 
Sharon’s statements in support of disengagement to be a warning against the eroding 
effects of occupation on the integrity of a democracy. This would be plausible if the 
Israeli government in general, and Sharon’s Likud party more specifically, conceived of 
Israel’s democracy as a liberal one, with its emphasis on individual liberties and 
equality. As explained above, however, Israel’s democracy is an ethnic democracy in a 
defending mode which obligates the defense of the ethnic democracy, allowing for a 
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wider range of policy options for defending such a democracy than is fathomable 
assuming a liberal democracy. Furthermore, Israel does not have an identity as an 
occupier, and government documents and representatives repeatedly reject this moniker 
in the discourse, insisting, for example, that the territory is “disputed” and not 
“occupied.”242  
Finally, Sharon’s statement is actually a reference to the long-standing 
demographic issue. In urging the Knesset to support the barrier policy and the 
disengagement plan, Sharon emphasizes the growing Palestinian population. 
Juxtaposing this fact against concerns for Israel’s democracy places a potential future 
Palestinian majority in opposition to Israel’s ethnic democracy. While the ethnic 
democracy institutionalizes the interests of the ethnic majority, it does not 
disenfranchise the minority, nor does it institutionalize the interests of the minority. An 
Arab majority under Israeli rule would threaten the Jewish national identity, as well as 
the ethnic democracy of Israel as a Jewish state. Disengagement, then, is not 
constructed in the discourse as an avoidance of a dissonance, but a means to secure 
Israel’s Jewish identity, which is inextricable from its ethnic democracy.  
Throughout the original speech referenced by Lupovici, Sharon addresses 
anxiety not over Israel’s identity as a democracy, but its Jewish national identity. 
Assuring Knesset members and the Israeli public tuning in of Israel’s commitment to 
the struggle for a Jewish homeland in Eretz Yisrael, he quotes Likud Party founder and 
former Prime Minister Menachem Begin, “We do not require anyone to supervise the 
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Kashrut of our commitment to the Land of Israel! We have dedicated our lives to the 
Land of Israel and to the struggle for its liberation and will continue to do so.”243 
‘Supervising Kashrut’ refers to verification by a qualified Jewish religious expert of the 
adherence to Jewish religious law; this most commonly refers to verification that a 
kitchen and the food it produces is kosher. Here, quoting Begin, Sharon is insisting to 
his party and his people that Israel’s religious claims to the land will not be forfeit by 
the barrier. Furthermore, with the exception of far-left human rights watchdogs like 
B’Tselem with far more liberal conceptualizations of democracy, anxiety over Israel’s 
democratic identity vis-à-vis its other identities is absent from the domestic political 
discourse of identity during the Intifada years.244 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the results of analysis of news articles, op-eds, government 
reports, political speeches, and interviews to determine why the Israeli government 
chose to erect the West Bank barrier. The violence of the Second Intifada and Israel’s 
initial response to it disrupted Israel’s routinized relationships with not only the 
Palestinians, but also with Arab-Israelis and the international community. Although the 
idea of disengagement and a barrier dates back to Yitzhak Rabin in the 1990s, such an 
option was not yet acceptable by the Israeli public and much of its leadership until the 
failure of Camp David and the outset of the Second Intifada. That is, until a change in 
Israel’s environment caused a disruption in its security routines, engendering 
uncertainty around its identities and resulting in ontological insecurity.  
                                                 
243 Sharon, 2004. 
244 Lein, 2002.  
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 Routines are habitual, requiring no conscious weighing of options or 
information. The automatic nature of routines insulates social actors against the anxiety-
producing unknown. Because routines are produced by relationships, drastic changes to 
these relationships disrupt routines, rendering the actor’s social world unknowable. The 
failure of Camp David and the beginning of the Second Intifada disrupted the routinized 
relationship between Israel and the Palestinians, rendering Israel’s social world 
unknowable. Giddens calls such crises “critical situations,” explaining them as 
“circumstances of a radical disjuncture of an unpredictable kind which affect substantial 
numbers of individuals, situations that threaten or destroy the certitudes of 
institutionalized routines.”245  
The violence of the Second Intifada also disrupted the relationship between 
Israelis and their public spaces, contributing to an ontological security crisis as the 
bustling centers of Jewish-Israeli life were rendered unsafe. Recall from Chapter Two 
that external factors such as environmental changes, a breakdown of intersubjective 
meaning in crisis, or the interventions of powerful outside actors influence how an 
individual’s actions are perceived and, in turn, the response they evoke. The failure of 
Camp David constituted an environmental change whereby routines between Israel and 
the Palestinians evoked different responses than before, bringing the IDF’s response to 
violence under scrutiny, for example, and eroding Israel’s basic trust system, i.e. the 
sense that the state’s attempts to secure itself physically would not threaten its national 
identities.  
                                                 
245 Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 61. 
93 
 
Anxiety over Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state is evident in news 
sources and government documents that express feelings of betrayal by the international 
community, outrage at the international community’s criticism of the IDF, and 
frustration from the Israeli public at the government’s hesitation to take unilateral 
action. Ontological insecurity vis-à-vis Israel’s Jewish national identity is evident in 
fears of a resurgence of international anti-Semitism, public distrust of Arabs and the 
reported desire to separate from them, anxiety over Palestinian claims to territory, and 
worry over potentially relinquishing more of Eretz Yisrael. The historical memory of 
the holocaust, forced migration, and diaspora, coupled with religious traditions 
connecting the Jewish identity to the Land of Israel, makes the Jewish identity of the 
state inextricable from Jewish-Israelis’ need for physical security. In this way, national 
security for Israel necessarily entails preservation of a Jewish state on the historical 
Jewish homeland. The Intifada threatened the Jewish national identity by putting at risk 
Israel’s claims to territory, its Jewish settlements, and recognition of its Jewish nature 
by the international community.  
This analysis finds that the democratic identity of Israel, however, was not 
continuously threatened by the violence of the Intifada or the state’s response to it, as 
the discourse evinces arguments that construct the Israeli democracy in such a way that 
actions taken to secure it were seen as congruous with the Jewish national identity and 
the security-seeking state identity. The existing dissonance, therefore, was addressed 
discursively before the barrier policy was passed. The barrier, then, was not a policy of 
avoidance, as Lupovici argues. Rather, following Sandholtz’s understanding, the 
evidence suggests that interlocutors successfully addressed the dissonance between the 
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Jewish national identity and the democratic national identity by constructing the latter 
as serving the former. While some anxiety over the Jewish national identity with regard 
to the barrier policy is prevalent in the early discourse, revised routes, meetings with 
and concessions to Jewish settlers, and assurances from party leaders on both sides of 
the political spectrum in Israel allayed this anxiety and successfully constructed the 
barrier as a solution, rather than a threat, to Israel’s Jewish identity. The decision to 
construct the West Bank barrier, even in the face of doubts that it would serve Israel’s 
physical security, was the result of an ontological security crisis brought on by the 
failure of Camp David, the subsequent outset of the Second Intifada, and the IDF’s 
initial response. The barrier policy as part of the unilateral disengagement plan served to 
secure Israel’s identities as a security-seeking state, a Jewish state, and an ethnic 
democracy.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
To say the barrier policy was solely the result of an ontological security crisis is too 
strong a conclusion to make. A very real physical security threat to the state of Israel 
generated an ontological security crisis. Several policy options were prevalent in the 
discourse as possible solutions to the conflict. These included dismantling settlements, 
return of territory, and an international intermediary, to name a few prominent 
options.246 The IDF itself concluded that there were four possible security solutions: 
continuing “current policy vis-à-vis the Palestinians…, declaring war on the PA, 
                                                 
246 See, for example Asher; also “Jerusalem Plan Passes First Hurdle,” Israel National News (Jerusalem), 
January 29, 2002. 
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agreeing to resume the peace talks at the point they stopped in Taba, and unilateral 
separation”—with continuation of current policy being the preferred security option and 
unilateral separation being the least desirable.247 In the end, the Israeli government 
chose the option that was least preferable among favored physical security solutions but 
best addressed its ontological insecurity. This study has found strong evidence of 
ontological insecurity in the discourse around the Second Intifada, as well as evidence 
for the discursive construction of the West Bank barrier as a solution to ontological 
insecurity. While a conclusion that the barrier policy was solely an ontological security 
measure cannot be made, the evidence presented here strongly suggests that ontological 
insecurity played a decisive role in physical security decision-making in this case. 
Furthermore, ontological security theory provides the best explanation for the barrier’s 
route, a problem for which realist perspectives offer little explanatory value. This 
section discusses the implications of this study for ontological security theory, 
democratic theory, and the Israeli-Palestinian peace process and highlights a few 
avenues for future research.   
 This study has some useful implications for ontological security theory, 
including building upon existing literature, confirming others’ assumptions, and raising 
potential questions for further investigation. My analysis, while ultimately diverging 
from Lupovici’s conclusions, supports his premise that a physical security threat can 
generate an ontological security threat. This analysis also finds, consistent with the 
works of Mitzen and Steele, that a state may choose a policy that best secures its 
identity, even if that policy is not the most prudent physical security option. 
                                                 
247 “Walls and Borders,” 2001. 
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Additionally, the results of this study imply that a state may respond to an existing 
physical security threat in ways that engender an ontological security threat, prompting 
the state to favor securing the latter to the detriment of the former.  
 Recall from the previous chapter that left-leaning groups within the state of 
Israel internalized the ontological insecurity around Israel’s identity as a security-
seeker. The international community’s insistence that Israel’s initial response to the 
violence of the Second Intifada constituted human rights violations is echoed by far-left 
groups in Israel. This internalization, however, is not evident beyond the boundaries of 
the political far-left in the domestic discourse. This is consistent with Mitzen’s 
understanding of the state as a corporate social actor. That is, as the state is a social 
group made up of individuals whose conceptualizations of themselves as members of 
that social group influence that group’s identity, incomplete internalization of a 
challenge to the group’s identity does not engender ontological insecurity. This also 
implies that there may be a tipping point at which internalization of an identity threat is 
complete enough to generate ontological security at the state level. Future research may 
seek to uncover under what circumstances internalization at the state level takes place. 
It is likely that regime type, the ontological insecurity discourse’s proximity to power, 
and framing may play significant roles. A more complete understanding of processes 
and conditions of internalization would then also have implications for international 
norm change.  
 In Chapter Two, I defined national identity, following Hopf and Allen, as a 
constellation of categories, which require relationships to maintain, meaning that any 
state has multiple identities and that its identity is different in interaction with different 
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significant others. Responses in the discourse to the international community and to 
Palestinian interlocutors differ and suggest that Israel’s identities conform to this 
understanding of identity. In Chapter Three, I discussed the anxiety evident in the 
discourse around Israel’s identity as a security-seeking state. The anxiety produced at 
having this identity challenged by the international community, compared with the lack 
of anxiety at Palestinian challenges to this identity, suggests that Israel’s identity as a 
security-seeking state is heavily dependent upon affirming routines between Israel and 
the international community, and particularly Western states.  
For ontological security theory, this implies that the same discursive challenges 
to a state’s identity may have different impacts depending upon the source and that 
challenges from the significant other salient to that specific identity are more likely to 
generate ontological insecurity. This also has implications for the Israeli-Palestinian 
peace process. Further perceived failures of security routines, such as existing 
checkpoints and intelligence gathering procedures, to support Israel’s identity as a 
security-seeking state may cause the state to adopt a second-best identity in the future. 
Recall that this identity is largely constructed discursively through the theme of security 
exceptionalism, which holds that Israel is exactly like any other state but exists in an 
exceptionally threatening security environment. If the state’s attachment mode to the 
relationships that affirm this perception of itself as behaving just as any other state 
would in its environment are rigid, this may engender another ontological security crisis 
as the international community continues to push back on the state’s actions as a 
security-seeker. As Israel’s relationship with the international community, particularly 
Western states, is especially salient to its security-seeker identity, routines that support a 
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second-best identity like that of competitor or aggressor may prompt an identity shift. 
Such a shift may complicate future negotiations as changes to identity engender changes 
to interests.  
In Chapter Two, I discussed how states may form rigid attachments to 
physically dangerous relationships, rendering them unable or unwilling to develop new 
routines and learn their way out of the unhealthy rigid attachment. Israel’s unilateral 
disengagement plan may have worked to secure the state’s national identities during the 
Intifada years, but the implementation of this plan has more closely resembled a partial 
disengagement and is currently not maintained unilaterally. The IDF continues to carry 
out routine operations in parts of the West Bank that remain shared territory with 
differing levels of administrative control split between the PA and the state of Israel. 
Because the scope of this study was limited to political discourse on the Second Intifada 
and the West Bank barrier and texts collected range only from 2000 to 2005 (shortly 
after the barrier policy was passed in the Knesset), it is impossible to ascertain if this 
partial disengagement and the continuation of Israel’s relationship with the Palestinians 
after the violence of the Intifada subsided is evidence of a rigid attachment mode to 
Israel’s asymmetrical relationship with the Palestinians. Another possible explanation 
could be that this partial disengagement further serves the Jewish national identity (with 
its connections to claims to Eretz Yisrael) and may be related to Israel’s perception of 
the Hamas election victory as a future threat. Further research could determine why 
Israel chose partial disengagement. 
As mentioned above, an actor’s preferred identity cannot always be confirmed. 
As external factors can influence how a social actor’s behavior is perceived, causing 
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routines to cease to support the preferred identity, a social actor may adopt a less 
preferred, but still acceptable, identity. Adopting a second-best identity can resolve 
ontological insecurity, as the routines in which the state participates that uphold this 
less-preferred identity do not require it to scrutinize its behavior. This would support the 
state’s basic trust system and render its social world knowable. After the Knesset 
approved construction of the West Bank barrier, many in the international community 
adopted the term “Apartheid Wall” and referred to Israel as an Apartheid state.  
One potential avenue of research could be to ascertain whether this continued 
backlash from the international community, coupled with the Boycott Divest Sanction 
movement, has caused Israel to reimagine its ingroup and, therefore, its role identity in 
the international system. As the United States has announced the opening of its embassy 
in Jerusalem and its withdrawal from the United Nations Human Rights Council 
explicitly on the grounds of alleged unfair treatment of Israel, all amid mounting 
criticism against Israel as violence resumed in 2015, the state of Israel may 
reconceptualize its identification with the international community. That is, Israel may 
join the United States as it appears to distance itself from Western allies. The 
ontological security crisis that arose during the Second Intifada suggests a rigid 
attachment mode on the part of Israel to its relationship with the Palestinians, however 
unhealthy. Ascertaining Israel’s attachment mode to its relationship with its ingroup in 
the international community may be useful in determining the extent to which this 
ingroup might successfully play a role in future negotiations. 
This study also has implications for democratic theory. Most notably, the results 
of this study make a case for understanding democracy as a set of partially overlapping 
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national identities. Although the Israeli democratic national identity was mildly 
threatened by the Second Intifada, it was successfully discursively subordinated to the 
Jewish national identity, alleviating ontological dissonance, further suggesting that the 
decision to construct the West Bank barrier was not an avoidance measure. The 
democratic identity’s prevalence in the discourse, especially juxtaposed with calls to 
exclude Arabs from the democratic process and fears of the demographic issue, suggest 
the importance of perception to the democratic national identity. The notion that 
exclusion from democratic processes can be necessary to secure a state’s democracy 
support Pedahzur’s conceptualization of a defending democracy, suggesting a spectrum 
of acceptable actions within the context of a democracy, depending on the type of 
democracy. Finally, this study also suggests that influential members of the Israeli 
political elite, as well as large pockets of the Israeli public, understand the Israeli 
democracy in ways that align with Smooha’s conceptualization of Israel as an ethnic 
democracy. This is further supported by recent moves by the Israeli government to 
further codify the state’s obligation to support the interests of the ethnoreligious 
majority. In June 2018, the state passed a bill that explicitly establishes Jewish cultural 
hegemony in the state, giving official status to Jewish holidays and the Jewish calendar, 
as well as the Hebrew language and religious symbols. The law also obligates the 
government to support Jewish settlement of Eretz Yisrael, including territory currently 
recognized as Palestinian, and recognizes the “unique right of national self-
determination” of the Jewish people in Israel.248 The Israeli government’s conduct of 
democracy suggests a comfort with the institutionalization of the ethno-religious 
                                                 
248 Jonathan Lis and Hoa Landau, “Israel Passes Controversial Jewish Nation-State Bill After Stormy 
Debate,” Haaretz (Jerusalem), July 19, 2018. 
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majority’s interests, suggesting, as Smooha does, a communal understanding of 
democracy that allows for a hierarchical type of citizenship based on community 
membership. Future research may seek to understand under what conditions a liberal 
democracy might take an ethnic turn.  
For the Israeli-Palestinian peace process, this intimates that international 
questions about Israel’s democracy may be rhetorically ineffective at influencing the 
state’s behavior. Indeed, one particularly salient, if disheartening, implication of these 
findings for the peace process is that, even as the United States casts off any semblance 
of neutrality in future negotiations, eroding the possibility that the Palestinians will 
accept the United States as a peace broker in the future, Israel’s ingroup within the 
international community is shrinking, reducing the state’s other options for a peace 
broker. It may be that future negotiations include the United States as a broker 
representing Israeli interests with one or more members of the Arab League taking a 
leadership role for the Palestinians. This means more identities, more interests, and 
more individuals at the negotiating table, further complicating the process.  
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